\u3cem\u3eSouth Dakota v. Wayfair\u3c/em\u3e: Erasing a Dull Bright-Line by Nuttall, Aidan V
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 
Volume 51 
Issue 2 Winter 2019 Article 10 
2019 
South Dakota v. Wayfair: Erasing a Dull Bright-Line 
Aidan V. Nuttall 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Aidan V. Nuttall, South Dakota v. Wayfair: Erasing a Dull Bright-Line, 51 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 623 (2020). 
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol51/iss2/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more information, please 
contact law-library@luc.edu. 
 623 
Note 
South Dakota v. Wayfair: Erasing a Dull Bright-Line 
Aidan V. Nuttall* 
For over half a century, states were unjustly deprived access to a 
significant portion of their tax bases due to Supreme Court precedent that 
was dated since its very inception. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. righted this 
wrong by granting states the power to lay taxes on out-of-state businesses 
that actively solicit sales from in-state customers. For decades the judicially-
created physical presence rule prevented states from collecting sales taxes 
on these transactions, moving tens of billions of tax dollars out of reach. The 
rule lead to exploitation by businesses at states’ expense.  
Aside from its detrimental effect, this rule has always been bad law. The 
constitutional principles and jurisprudence applied to adopt this rule were 
taken from outdated and rejected Supreme Court opinions that had no place 
at the physical presence rule’s inception, and certainly have no place today. 
The Court’s focus on this rule’s effect represents a return to constitutional 
form through its rejection of hyper-formal distinctions and embrace of 
practical considerations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Looking through Supreme Court jurisprudence, one will notice trends 
in the Court’s interpretation of certain subjects that differ from—and even 
contradict—evidence of the Court tirelessly working towards a common 
and logical interpretation of law.1 One of the most hotly contested and 
inconsistent arenas of Supreme Court interpretation surrounds the 
outermost limits of the dormant Commerce Clause.2 The contradiction 
throughout dormant Commerce Clause history lies in two methods of the 
clause’s interpretation: a formal and objective inquiry, which seeks a 
unified standard through jurisprudence, versus a realistic and practical 
inquiry, which focuses on consequences concerning the effect of the 
Court’s interpretation on a given case and area of law affected by it.3 Our 
 
1. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–50 (2004) (tracing the history of the 
Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause back to sixteenth century 
English common law through contemporary application in formulating a new rule which rejected 
the former standard requiring reliability analysis for a more objective standard); see also Hugh 
Evander Willis, Some Conflicting Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 13 VA. L. REV. 
155, 164, 169 (1927) (examining trends in the Supreme Court’s definition of commerce and 
declaring the evolution of the Court’s definitions created distinctions equal to “conflicting decisions 
or so fine that they are practically incomprehensible”). 
2. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309–11 (1992) (detailing the Supreme Court’s 
back-and-forth holdings regarding formal versus practical readings of the states’ power under the 
dormant Commerce Clause); see also Peter A. Lauricella, The Real “Contract with America”: The 
Original Intent of the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1377, 1397 
(1997) (describing the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the Commerce Clause as some of 
the Court’s most famous decisions of its precedent); see also Willis, supra note 1, at 169 
(concluding in 1927 “that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court upon the [C]ommerce 
[C]lause are in hopeless conflict”). 
3. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994) (defining formalism as 
legislative language which “erects barriers to commerce” and pragmatism as a “case-by-case 
analysis of purposes and effects”); see also Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce 
Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (quoting GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 195 (3d ed. 1996)) (“Under the formal approach, the Court examined the 
statute and the regulated activity to determine whether certain objective criteria are satisfied. . . . In 
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country’s history is closely tied to the multiple eras of judicial 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, eras that have gone so far as to 
invoke direct action from the executive branch.4 A general understanding 
of the dichotomy between formalism and pragmatism is important to 
understanding the scope of this Note, as it touches on trends in law that 
have most recently favored pragmatism in interpreting the Commerce 
Clause.5 While an expansive topic, and one with a considerable 
background in academic analysis,6 the mere existence of this 
contradiction is not the subject of this Note.7 
Instead, this Note dives deeper to focus on a product of formal 
interpretation, an abnormality in contemporary judicial interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause—the physical presence rule.8 Birthed on the tail 
end of formalism in 1967, it missed the boat on a course set towards 
pragmatism.9 The precedential vitality of the physical presence rule is an 
 
contrast, the realist approach attempted to determine the actual economic impact of the 
regulation.”). 
4. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 3 (1998) (discussing President Roosevelt’s attempt to use his 
popularity in Congress to override the Court’s conservative interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
through the failed Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937, a plan to pack the Supreme Court with 
liberal Justices to favorably rule for Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation); Drew D. Hansen, The Sit-
Down Strikes and the Switch in Time, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 49, 54 (2000) (discussing that President 
Roosevelt “is thought to have forced the Court to back down” from the labor movement). 
5. See infra Section I.C. See also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 
(1977) (emphasis added) (finding that the rule in question in this case had been “stripped of any 
practical significance” and that “[t]here is no economic consequence that follows necessarily from 
the . . . [rule] . . . and a focus on that formalism merely obscures the question whether the tax 
produces a forbidden effect”). 
6. See , e.g., Cushman, supra note 3, at 1089 (dedicating an entire law review article to the 
subject of realism versus formalism exclusively between the years of 1895–1942); Donald H. 
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092–94 (1986) (discussing exclusively interpretations of the 
dormant Commerce Clause between 1935–86 to support a thesis, founded in Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), that certain cases related to interstate commerce should face a balancing 
test); Willis, supra note 1, at 163–69 (discussing the already-apparent contradiction in Commerce 
Clause cases only a quarter-century into the 1900s); see also Lauricella, supra note 2, at 1377–80 
(analyzing the defined federal limitations on regulating interstate commerce rather than state 
limitations). 
7. See infra notes 23–33 and accompanying text (discussing the direction and focus of this 
Note). 
8. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (explaining that the precedent for 
the physical presence rule “might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time 
today”); see also Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (“Everyone before us acknowledges that Quill is among the most contentious of all 
dormant commerce clause cases.”). 
9. To be sure, recent examples of formalistic interpretation of the Commerce Clause existed in 
1967. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946) (discussing formal distinctions 
between direct and indirect burdens upon interstate commerce); Spector Motor Servs., Inc. v. 
O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609–10 (1951) (delineating interstate and intrastate taxation as applied to 
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enigma amongst modern Commerce Clause interpretation, and for fifty 
years it has diametrically opposed pragmatic approaches in favor of a 
supposedly simpler solution in Commerce Clause readings.10 The Court 
recently overturned the physical presence rule in South Dakota v. 
Wayfair, Inc., updating its stance on taxation of interstate commerce in 
light of contemporary pragmatism through interpretation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.11 
Specifically, the physical presence rule required that for a State to force 
sellers or distributors to collect and remit sales or use taxes on products 
sold into its jurisdiction,12 the seller must have had either property or 
 
the same transaction). But compare Ry. Express Agency v. Virginia (Railway Express I), 347 U.S. 
359, 369 (1954) (invalidating a tax based on the language of the tax which taxed the “privilege” of 
interstate business), with Ry. Express Agency v. Virginia (Railway Express II), 358 U.S. 434, 445 
(1959) (affirming a similar tax with different language five years after the first reached Supreme 
Court review), and Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 284 (“There was no real economic difference 
between the statutes in Railway Express I and Railway Express II.”). However, there was reliable 
evidence that trends in formalism were on the decline. See Railway Express II, 358 U.S. at 441 
(noting the effect of “magic words” or loopholes that crafty legislative language had upon the 
validity of legislation); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 310 (“[The case creating the physical presence 
rule] was decided in 1967, in the middle of the latest rally between formalism and pragmatism.”). 
10. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2092 (2018) (describing the physical 
presence rule, particularly as justified in Quill, as “the sort of arbitrary, formalistic distinctions that 
the Court’s modern Commerce Clause precedents disavow”); see also Direct Mktg. Ass’n, 814 F.3d 
at 1148 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (first citing Direct Mktg. Ass’n, 814 F.3d at 1137 n.14; then citing 
Quill, 504 U.S. at 319–20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement); then 
citing id. at 321–33 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and then citing Direct 
Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134–35 (2015)) (“Everyone before us acknowledges that 
[the physical presence rule has] been the target of criticism over many years from many quarters, 
including from many members of the Supreme Court.”). 
11. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (expressly overruling the physical presence rule and 
precedents supporting it); see also id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring) (writing separately only to 
express that he believed his former participation in the Quill majority opinion was an error, 
concluding that the physical presence rule was rightly overturned). 
12. To clarify, sales taxes are excise taxes imposed on transfers or transactions of tangible 
personal property or services; whereas use taxes are “complementary taxes to the sales tax” and are 
applied by the State in which the actual use of tangible personal property or services occurs. 
Nathaniel T. Trelease, Taxing Internet Sales: Bringing the Old Economy to the New Economy, 32 
COLO. LAW., Dec. 2003, at 11, 12; see also McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944) 
(defining sales and use taxes, respectively, as a tax upon the freedom of purchase and a tax upon 
the enjoyment of goods sold). The sales tax is typically collected by the seller in addition to the 
transaction so it can be subsequently remitted to the jurisdiction in which the transaction is 
consummated. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088 (describing this common method of collection and 
concluding that “[m]any States employ this kind of complementary sales and use tax regime”). The 
common issue with use taxes, for the purposes of this article, is that use tax compliance is low 
because the jurisdiction is forced to rely upon the consumer to evaluate, report, and pay the tax. See 
id. at 2088 (describing consumer use tax compliance rates as “notoriously low,” and in some 
instances as low as 4 percent) (first citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–18–114, 
SALES TAXES 5 (2017) [hereinafter Sales Taxes Report], https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/ 
688437.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBH6-RS2K]; and then citing CA. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, 
REVENUE ESTIMATE: ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND MAIL ORDER SALES 7 tbl.3 (2013)). 
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employees in that State.13 This requirement enabled out-of-state 
(“remote”) sellers to exploit the substantial connection they had to states 
that they did business in to avoid sales taxes on products, giving them an 
unfair advantage over local sellers and traditional brick and mortar 
businesses.14 The rule was created in 1967 in National Bellas Hess, Inc. 
v. Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois, and only once faced a 
significant Supreme Court challenge in 1992 in Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, which upheld the rule’s Commerce Clause foundation.15 It was 
not until the South Dakota legislature drafted Senate Bill 106, a desperate 
plea to the Supreme Court, that the Court reexamined the rule in South 
Dakota v. Wayfair and ultimately overturned it in June 2018.16 In its 
decision, the Court rejected the “bright line”17 rule for a standard that 
focuses on pragmatic considerations in determining whether states may 
levy taxes upon interstate commerce.18 
 
13. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 306–07 (differentiating “between mail-order sellers with retail outlets, 
solicitors, or property within a State, and those who do no more than communicate with customers 
in the State by mail or common carrier”); see also Matthew C. Boch, Way(un)fair? United States 
Supreme Court Decision Ends State Tax Physical Presence Nexus Test, 53 ARK. LAW., Summer 
2018, at 18, 18 (explaining the physical presence rule as a limitation “that a business whose contacts 
were limited to mail and deliveries by common carrier could not be required to collect tax”). 
14. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 763 (1967) (Fortas, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that the rule gives an unfair advantage to sellers who make “calculated, 
systematic exploitation[s]” of foreign markets); see also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (quoting 
ARTHUR B. LAFFER & DONNA ARDUIN, PRO-GROWTH TAX REFORM AND E-FAIRNESS 4 (July 
2013), https://www.sos.ms.gov/Policy-Research/Documents/2ArtLafferStudy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3RGG-85QG]) (“Quill created an inefficient ‘online sales tax loophole’ that gives 
out-of-state businesses an advantage.”). 
15. The Court initially accepted the physical presence rule under two arguments, one supported 
by the Commerce Clause, and the other by the Due Process Clause. See generally Bellas Hess, 386 
U.S. 753. See also infra Section I.B (briefly detailing the Court’s position supported by the Due 
Process Clause). However, the Quill Court rejected the Due Process Clause support for the physical 
presence rule, but ultimately chose to uphold the rule as an “artificial” boundary of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315–16 (explaining that the physical presence rule is an 
arbitrary bright-line rule for the sake of clarity and business development in interstate commerce); 
see also infra Section I.D (detailing the Quill opinion and its rationale in support of the physical 
presence rule under the Commerce Clause). 
16. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088 (emphasis added) (citing S.B. 106, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st 
Sess. (S.D. 2016) [hereinafter S.B. 106]) (explaining that South Dakota legislators enacted “[a]n 
Act to provide for the collection of sales taxes from certain remote sellers, to establish certain 
Legislative findings, and to declare an emergency”); see also State v. Wayfair Inc., 901 N.W.2d 
754, 758 (S.D. 2017) (quoting S.B. 106, supra) (“[T]he Act contained an emergency clause 
declaring it ‘necessary for the support of the state government’ . . . .”). 
17. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added) (“Like other bright-line tests, the Bellas Hess 
rule appears artificial at its edges . . . .”); see also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 315) (“What may have seemed like a ‘clear,’ ‘bright-line tes[t]’ when 
Quill was written now threatens to compound the arbitrary consequences that should have been 
apparent from the outset.”). 
18. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (alterations in original) (quoting Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City 
of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009)) (“[S]uch a nexus is established when the taxpayer [or collector] 
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This Note aims to not only support the idea that Wayfair correctly 
decided that the physical presence rule was an unnecessary application of 
the Commerce Clause in 2018, but also to combat the assertion that the 
physical presence rule was ever a correct interpretation.19 The physical 
presence rule has never been good law.20 Its formalistic approach to 
Commerce Clause interpretation was dated even at its inception.21 For 
over half a century the rule tormented state legislators who could do 
nothing to defend against their state’s eroding tax base as the rule 
prevented them from collecting taxes on remote transactions that cost 
them millions, and more recently billions, of dollars on an annual basis.22 
Part I of this Note will briefly discuss the origins of the rule, touching 
on the historical and jurisprudential circumstances of its creation.23 This 
part will also give a brief description of the Commerce Clause, that details 
the Court’s recognition of its negative implications.24 Part I will conclude 
by tracing the rule’s limited progression through Supreme Court 
precedent, briefly touching on the practical effect it had on commerce.25 
Next, Part II will provide the facts of South Dakota v. Wayfair and the 
procedural history leading to the Supreme Court’s holding, which is the 
 
avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in that jurisdiction.”). 
19. See infra Part III (analyzing Bellas Hess, Quill, and Wayfair to demonstrate the originally 
misinterpreted rule in 1967, and the hazardous effects it has had since); see also infra Part V 
(concluding same). 
20. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (“[T]he physical presence rule, both as first formulated and 
as applied today, is an incorrect interpretation of the Commerce Clause.”); see also Bellas Hess, 
386 U.S. at 765–66 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (failing to understand the majority’s logic, which 
precluded businesses that regularly engaged with foreign markets as exempt from collecting sales 
tax). 
21. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 764–65 (criticizing that the majority’s reference to a “sensible, 
practical conception of the Commerce Clause” in precedent to create a meaningless distinction in 
the case at bar); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 310 (detailing the Court’s history of interpretation and 
concluding that Bellas Hess was decided during the shift away from formalistic interpretation and 
towards pragmatism). 
22. See Sales Taxes Report, supra note 12, at 11 (explaining that states are losing out, on the 
low end of the estimate, at least $8 billion annually through inability to collect sales taxes on remote 
sellers); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5–6, South 
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494) [hereinafter Wayfair U.S. Amicus 
Curiae] (alterations in original) (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-1(1) (2017)) (“According 
to the statute’s legislative findings, the obstacles to collecting [sales] taxes have ‘seriously erod[ed] 
the sales tax base of th[e] state’ and have ‘caus[ed] revenue losses and imminent harm . . . through 
the loss of critical funding for state and local services.’”) . 
23. See infra Part I (detailing the rationale of Bellas Hess and Quill to expose the flawed 
foundation of the physical presence rule). 
24. See id. (detailing the origins of the dormant Commerce Clause and its modern approach to 
interpretation). 
25. See id. (detailing the only chances at direct Supreme Court review that the rule has had and 
the rationale for maintaining it). 
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focal point of this Note.26 It will also briefly outline the concurring and 
dissenting opinions.27 Then, Part III will analyze the Court’s holding 
against a backdrop of historical judicial interpretation, as well pragmatic 
considerations.28 It will contend that the Court correctly rejected the 
physical presence rule as a necessary interpretation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.29 Part III will also show that the physical presence 
rule had disastrous implications, demonstrating its misplacement in 
jurisprudence in the first place.30 Further, Part III will examine how states 
have been legitimately prepared to not only survive, but thrive without 
the restrictions of the physical presence rule.31 It will then discuss several 
states’ proactive legislation that allows them to claim taxes that they have 
a constitutional right to collect.32 Ultimately, Part IV will conclude with 
an examination of dated concerns that some states who choose not to levy 
sales or use taxes purport, which contradict the foundation of their 
arguments against protectionism.33 
I.  COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGIN 
A.  What is the Dormant Commerce Clause? 
The Commerce Clause allows Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .”34 Implicit within the 
Commerce Clause is the dormant Commerce Clause, which prevents 
states from unduly burdening or discriminating against interstate 
commerce.35 It has been a subject of both scrutiny and disinterest since 
 
26. See infra Part II (detailing the recent Wayfair decision’s procedural history and South 
Dakota’s regulation which led to Respondents’ complaint). 
27. See id. (detailing Justice Thomas’s and Gorsuch’s concurring opinions and Chief Justice 
Roberts’s dissenting opinion). 
28. See infra Part III (detailing and analyzing the Bellas Hess and Quill opinions to expose the 
physical presence rule’s formalistic foundation). 
29. See id. (detailing and analyzing Wayfair’s correct rejection of the physical presence rule). 
30. See id. (detailing and analyzing the actual negative effects of the physical presence rule 
through history and the likely negative effects it would have as e-commerce continues to grow). 
31. See infra Part IV (detailing the impact of the decision in the months since Wayfair). 
32. See id. (detailing the legislative efforts of States to formulate new tax statutes to comply 
with the Supreme Court’s newly endorsed limitations). 
33. See id. (detailing the concerns of Respondents and supporters of the physical presence rule 
and exposing them as baseless). 
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. But see Sam Kalen, Dormancy Versus Innovation: A Next 
Generation Dormant Commerce Clause, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 381, 381–82 (2013) (footnote omitted) 
(“The negative or dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause . . . presumes that certain national issues 
are reserved exclusively to Congress and state and local governments are prohibited from intruding 
into those areas absent congressional assent.”). 
35. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2090–91 (2018) (“Modern precedents 
rest upon two primary principles that mark the boundaries of a State’s authority to regulate 
interstate commerce. First, state regulations may not discriminate against interstate commerce; and 
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its conception, inviting both criticism and encouragement from the 
judiciary and legal scholars.36 Some even believe the dormant Commerce 
Clause is unfounded in anything except precedent.37 But, right or wrong, 
the dormant Commerce Clause is a judicially recognized doctrine that is 
very much alive today.38 In sum, it is a nebulous concept that concerns 
the outermost-limit of states’ ability to regulate interstate commerce 
against Congress’s plenary claim to regulate interstate commerce.39 It 
represents the assumption, drawn from the Commerce Clause’s silence 
about state power, that state legislatures must be entitled to some form of 
authority to regulate commerce.  
The dormant Commerce Clause is derived from the dicta of Chief 
Justice Marshall in two seminal cases, both quoted by the Supreme Court 
in Wayfair.40 The first case, Gibbons v. Ogden, surrounded an issue of 
infringement upon the powers of Congress by New York legislators who 
granted exclusive commercial access to waterways between New York 
and New Jersey.41 In his opinion, while questioning the theory of strict 
 
second, States may not impose undue burdens on interstate commerce.”); see also West Lynn 
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994) (explaining that the purpose of the dormant 
Commerce Clause “prohibits economic protectionism,” which would allow States to levy 
burdensome or discriminatory taxes upon interstate commerce for the benefit of its own 
jurisdiction). 
36. See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259−65 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. 
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959)) (“It takes no more than our opinions this Term, and the 
number of prior decisions they explicitly or implicitly overrule, to demonstrate that the practical 
results we have educed from the so-called ‘negative’ Commerce Clause form not a rock but a 
‘quagmire.’”); see also Tenn. Wine and Spirits Retailers Assoc. v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2459 
(2019) (noting a split of opinion regarding the doctrine’s legitimacy between its originator, Chief 
Justice Marshall, and his immediate successor, Chief Justice Taney); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. 
Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 
DUKE L.J. 569, 570−71 (1987) (describing the dormant Commerce Clause as “an arcane aspect of 
American constitutional law” but noting a surge in interest and examination by scholars as well as 
the Supreme Court in the 1980s). 
37. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 36, at 599 (rejecting all conceivable justification for 
recognition of the dormant Commerce Clause). 
38. See Tyler Pipe Indus., 483 U.S. at 259−60 (citing Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232 
(1872)) (“[T]he doctrine of the negative Commerce Clause was formally adopted as holding of this 
Court.”). 
39. See Lauricella, supra note 2, at 1397 (“[T]he so-called ‘dormant’ commerce clause question, 
which involves ascertaining how far state regulatory laws can go in burdening interstate commerce 
without intruding upon the power granted to Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”); see also 
Regan, supra note 6, at 1094–95 (defining dormant Commerce Clause protectionism as legislation 
that benefits local jurisdictions specifically against other states). 
40. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2090 (first citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); and then 
citing Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829)) (“And so both a broad 
interpretation of interstate commerce and the concurrent regulatory power of the States can be 
traced to Gibbons and Willson.”). 
41. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 212. Gibbons was larger in effect than merely defining the dormant 
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constitutional construction, Marshall states, “[w]hich power can never be 
exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of 
agents, or lie dormant.”42 
The second, and more direct, utterance in case law came from Willson 
v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., where Justice Marshall pens: 
We do not think the act empowering the Black Bird Creek Marsh 
Company to place a dam across the creek, can, under all the 
circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the power to 
regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any 
law passed on the subject.43 
Willson was one of many decisions to clarify the extent of the states’ 
ability to regulate local, in-state commerce when it technically infringed 
upon Congress’s ability to regulate interstate commerce.44 However, it 
was not until Case of the State Freight Tax in 1872 that the Supreme 
Court formally recognized the doctrine.45 
The line which separates State and Congressional territory under the 
Commerce Clause is blurry at best.46 Still the Supreme Court must strike 
 
Commerce Clause; it is commonly referenced as the beginning of the Court’s efforts towards 
defining commerce. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2090 (internal citation omitted) (“Gibbons v. Ogden 
began setting the course by defining the meaning of commerce.”). 
42. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189 (referencing the Constitution of the United States, Marshall 
explains that it is a document “of enumeration, and not of definition” in support of a reflexive 
interpretation of the Constitution).   
43. See Willson, 27 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added) (explaining that although regulating the 
tributary in question does technically fall into the scope of regulating interstate commerce, it is so 
negligible a regulation that the Federal Government is, and should be, unconcerned with the 
outcome of what the many states do with their smallest streams); James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, 
Construction and Application of Dormant Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl.3—Supreme 
Court Cases, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 2d § 31 (2009) (explaining that the remedial nature of the State’s 
legislation was not in contravention of Congressional action or “the powers of the federal 
government”). 
44. See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 430–31 (1827) (interpreting the Import-Export 
Clause and Commerce Clause of the Constitution to prohibit States from levying discriminatory 
taxes upon imported goods); see also Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888) (“[N]o 
State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form.”); W. Live Stock v. Bureau of 
Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 256–58 (1938) (rejecting a focus on formal concerns such as direct versus 
indirect analysis of State taxation, and instead focusing on whether a tax subjected States to multiple 
or duplicative taxation); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946) (returning to formal 
considerations, specifically the direct versus indirect analysis of taxation); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. 
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (holding that Oklahoma was allowed to tax 
transportation services for interstate travel when the tickets were purchased in Oklahoma). 
45. See generally Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232 (1872); see also Tyler Pipe Indus., 
Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259−60 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted) (recognizing Case of the State Freight Tax as the 
origin of the dormant Commerce Clause.”). 
46. The Supreme Court will often approach its analysis of this line by examination of whether 
the rule offends interstate Commerce via discriminations or burden rather than an examination of 
the States’ limitation itself. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091 (noting that concerns of burdens upon 
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a balance. On the one hand, the Court must strike down state legislation 
that engenders state protectionism intruding upon Congress’ plenary 
ability in interstate commerce, and on the other, it must reject 
burdensome congressional action that shuts out state legislatures from 
this area of law-making altogether.47 
B.  The Inception of the Physical Presence Rule 
This is where formalism and pragmatism enter the frame as a judicial 
means of reaching this delicate balance between federal and state 
authority in commerce legislation.48 In reaching this middle ground, the 
Supreme Court has historically fallen on both sides of the line.49 The 
modern era of interpretation embodies a practical reading of legislation 
under the dormant and affirmative Commerce Clauses.50 National Bellas 
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of State of Illinois, the case which 
crafted the physical presence rule, was decided in 1967 by a Court leaning 
away from formalism.51 
 
or discrimination against interstate commerce are the “two principles [that] guide the courts in 
adjudicating cases challenging state laws under the Commerce Clause”); see also Brown-Forman 
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (citing Raymond Motor 
Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440–41 (1978)) (“We have also recognized that there is no 
clear line separating the category of state regulation that is virtually per se invalid under the 
Commerce Clause.”). 
47. See Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. at 248 (“The clause which vests in Congress the 
power to regulate commerce does not, ipso facto, take from the States the right to also regulate 
commerce, provided that the regulation of the latter do not come in conflict with those of the 
former.”). Protectionist legislation is legislation which violates Congress’s plenary power to 
regulate interstate commerce. See generally Regan, supra note 6 (explaining that the dormant 
Commerce Clause assists the Court in balancing concerns between local and interstate commerce 
to ensure that states do not engage in protectionism, or in a simpler sense, state-enacted legislation 
which discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of local commerce thus infringing upon 
Congress’s plenary power to regulate commerce). 
48. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 181−82 (tracing a portion of the history of these methods 
of interpretation in highlighting the court’s endorsement of formalism in the late 19th century into 
the Roosevelt era when the court began crawling towards pragmatism); see also Cushman, supra 
note 3, at 1089 (“Exegesis of the principal Commerce Clause cases decided by the Supreme Court 
between 1895 and 1942 typically proceeds with the aid of two rough and ready organizational 
rubrics: ‘formalism’ and ‘realism.’”). 
49. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309–10 (1992) (detailing the Court’s 
evolution of dormant Commerce Clause interpretation and its contemporary rejection of formal 
interpretation). See generally Cushman, supra note 3 (detailing and defining moments of formalism 
and pragmatism in the Court’s jurisprudence between the Civil War and World War II). 
50. This is evidenced by the controlling standard for State legislation of interstate commerce 
birthed in Complete Auto. See infra Section I.C (discussing pragmatism through detailing of 
Complete Auto); see also Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Complete Auto, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)) (“The [Complete Auto] test 
focuses on a statute’s ‘practical effect’ rather than its ‘formal language’ . . . .”). 
51. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 310 (“Bellas Hess was decided in 1967, in the middle of this latest 
rally between formalism and pragmatism.”). See also Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279 n.8 (first 
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National Bellas Hess, Inc. (Bellas Hess) was a large mail-order house 
fixed in North Kansas City, Missouri, which had no tangible or real 
property nor employees in Illinois.52 The only relation it had to Illinois 
was through United States Mail or common carrier.53 Despite its position 
out of state, Bellas Hess also managed to accrue over $2 million in sales 
from Illinois business over the fifteen-month period that taxes were 
assessed before the company filed suit.54 
The Illinois Use Tax Act (UTA) became effective in 1955.55 The UTA 
initially only applied a tax on retailers maintaining a place of business in 
Illinois, but subsequent to a 1961 amendment the definition of in-state 
retailers was changed to encompass those “engaging in soliciting orders 
within [Illinois] from users by means of catalogues or other advertising, 
whether such orders are received or accepted within or without 
[Illinois].”56 This amendment provoked Bellas Hess to file suit.57 
Bellas Hess challenged the UTA under both the Due Process Clause 
and the Commerce Clause, arguing that the UTA imposed an undue 
burden on interstate commerce and claimed that Bellas Hess held 
 
citing Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); then citing Memphis 
Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948); and then citing Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 
(1940)) (referencing several decisions prior to 1967 which endorsed pragmatic interpretation); see 
also Cushman, supra note 3, at 1093–94 (explaining the “realist” tradition’s rise in the late 1930s, 
though taking it a step further in opining that both methods of interpretation have fallen by the 
wayside). 
52. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 753–54 (1967) (quoting 
Dep’t of Revenue v. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc., 214 N.E.2d 755, 757 (Ill. 1966)) (“The appellant, 
National Bellas Hess, is a mail order house with its principal place of business in North Kansas, 
City Missouri . . . . ‘[Bellas Hess] does not maintain in Illinois any office . . . [and] it does not have 
in Illinois any agent . . . .’”); see also Brief for Appellee at 5–6, Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (No. 241), 1967 WL 113902, at *5–6 [hereinafter Bellas Hess 
Brief for Appellee] (detailing same). 
53. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754 (“All of the contacts which [Bellas Hess] does have with 
the State are via the United States mail or common carrier.”). But see id. at 761 (Fortas, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the “large-scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation of the 
Illinois consumer market”); Bellas Hess Brief for Appellee, supra note 52, at 14–15 (arguing that 
the Court should focus its distinction on the realistic and regular effect of Bellas Hess’s engagement 
with Illinois). 
54. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 761–62 (finding that Bellas Hess’s sales into Illinois “amounted 
to $2,174,744” in the period which the taxes at issue were assessed); see also Bellas Hess Brief for 
Appellee, supra note 52, at 20 (detailing same). 
55. See 120 ILL. COMP. STAT. 439/1 (1963) (defining the effective date as July 14, 1955); see 
also Bellas Hess, 214 N.E.2d at 757 (detailing same). 
56. See Bellas Hess, 214 N.E.2d at 757 (citing 120 ILL. COMP. STAT. 439/2 (1965)) (altering 
the definition for what constitutes a taxable retailer by encompassing out-of-state retailers as well). 
57. See id. at 757 (detailing Bellas Hess’s arguments founded in the amendments defining in-
state retailers); see also Bellas Hess Brief for Appellee, supra note 52, at 6 n.4 (describing the 
amendment as “critical”). 
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insufficient minimum contacts to the state to establish due process.58 The 
Court accepted both of these arguments.59 
The opinion blurred the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause 
defenses in favor of Bellas Hess, making scarce distinction between the 
two justifications other than their actual definitions.60 Ultimately, the 
Court derived the physical presence rule via comparison to pre-
established Supreme Court limitations on interstate taxation.61 The Court 
noted that the furthest extension of a state’s ability to lay tax on interstate 
commerce is shown in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, where the Court upheld a 
Florida tax on a Georgia seller when only ten of the company’s salesmen 
worked in Florida.62 The Court then attempted to define the opposite end 
of the spectrum by citing to Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, which held that 
Maryland could not impose a tax obligation on a Delaware seller with no 
property, sales solicitors, or even direct advertising in Maryland.63 
Through this comparison the Court derived the physical presence rule.64 
The Court reasoned that a transaction by mail constituted only “general 
interstate business” and that most courts recognized an informal 
distinction based on physical presence, so it officially endorsed physical 
 
58. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756 (explaining the foundation of Bellas Hess’s arguments 
against the amended statute); see generally Bellas Hess Brief for Appellee, supra note 52 
(addressing both arguments through the brief). 
59. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760 (reversing the State Supreme Court’s judgment).  
60. See generally Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. 753 (addressing both arguments through comparison 
of mostly two cases without much reference to the Due Process Clause or Commerce Clause 
through the analysis); see also id. at 762 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court’s 
application of Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954), stating that it is not sufficiently 
related to the case at bar). 
61. See id. at 757–60 (majority opinion) (first citing Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 
(1960); and then citing Miller Bros., 347 U.S. 340) (analyzing the furthest extent of Due Process 
Clause and Commerce Clause approval of State-imposed taxation duties versus an example of the 
Court’s rejection of State-imposed taxation duties based on the Due Process Clause and Commerce 
Clause). 
62. See id. at 757 (characterizing the States’ ability to lay tax upon interstate commerce in 
Scripto as the “furthest constitutional reach to date”); see also Scripto, 362 U.S. at 213 
(Whittaker, J., dissenting) (expressing his disagreement in the judgment on only Due Process 
grounds, endorsing the Court’s application of the Commerce Clause allowing for tenuous physical 
presence). 
63. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758 (detailing the facts of Miller Bros. in an effort to compare 
the rationale there to the case at bar); see also Scripto, 362 U.S. at 212–13 (comparing its rationale 
to Miller Bros. and setting the foundation for the Court’s errant comparison in Bellas Hess). But 
see Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758 (explaining that regular marketing, quarterly advertising releases, 
and substantial sales into the State were still insufficient grounds to support taxation). 
64. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 757–60 (citing Scripto and Miller Bros. to work towards a 
common rule regarding state taxation of interstate commerce). But see Scripto, 362 U.S. at 213 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (writing separately only to disagree with the majority’s attempt to 
compare the decision in Scripto to the rationale in Miller Bros.). 
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presence as a minimum threshold.65 In defense of its new rule, the Court 
added that exposing Bellas Hess to a sales tax absent physical presence 
in Illinois might subject it, and other businesses like it, to a “virtual welter 
of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim” 
to impose a tax.66 
The Court was not unanimous in its decision, and Justice Fortas voiced 
his concerns through a dissent joined by Justices Black and Douglas.67 
The dissent focused on Bellas Hess’s meaningful and systematic 
engagement with Illinois.68 It viewed the majority decision as prejudicing 
local businesses by giving remote sellers a competitive advantage to 
engage with in-state markets.69 The dissent briefly conceded that some 
form of the majority’s rule was necessary in the context of irregular or 
individual transactions,70 lending general support towards formalist 
interpretation. But it qualified that concession in the same breath, 
explaining that a business engaging in a “calculated, systematic 
exploitation of the market” was practically as connected to a state as any 
physically-present business would be.71 According to the dissent, the 
 
65. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758 (footnote omitted) (“In order to uphold the power of Illinois 
to impose use tax burdens on [Bellas Hess] in this case, we would have to repudiate totally the 
sharp distinction which these and other decisions have drawn between mail order sellers with retail 
outlets, solicitors, or property within a State, and those who do no more than communicate with 
customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business. But this 
basic distinction, which until now has been generally recognized by the state taxing authorities, is 
a valid one, and we decline to obliterate it.”). But see id. at 764–65 (Fortas, J., dissenting) 
(explaining the “sensible, practical conception” of the Commerce Clause applied in Scripto and its 
accurate comparison here, while failing to endorse the distinction which the majority reached when 
off-setting the Scripto rationale with Miller Bros.). 
66. See id. at 759−60 (majority opinion) (“The many variations in rates of tax, in allowable 
exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping requirements could entangle [Bellas Hess’s] 
interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no 
legitimate claim to impose ‘a fair share of the cost of the local government.’”). 
67. See generally Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760–66 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Also note that Justice 
White was included in the majority opinion, but then he dissents twenty-five years later in Quill for 
the majority’s failure to give “Bellas Hess the complete burial it justly deserves.” Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 322 (1992) (White, J., dissenting). 
68. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 762−63 (“Under the present arrangement, it conducts its 
substantial, regular, and systematic business in Illinois and the State demands only that it collect 
from its customer-users—and remit to the State—the use tax which is merely equal to the sales tax 
which resident merchants must collect and remit.”); see also Bellas Hess Brief for Appellee, supra 
note 52, at 7–8 (arguing that the “substantiality of the business results obtained” by Bellas Hess 
sufficiently meets minimum contact criteria). 
69. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 763 (describing the rule adopted by the Court as “competitive 
discrimination”). 
70. See id. (explaining that “where sales are occasional, minor and sporadic” that the states 
should not have the ability to tax said transactions); see also Bellas Hess Brief for Appellee, supra 
note 52, at 14 (explaining that Court’s nexus requirement is decided by systematic engagement, 
which adequately addresses concerns of those occasionally involved in interstate commerce). 
71. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 763 (“[Advantage to remote sellers] certainly should not be 
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“welter of complicated obligations” referenced in the majority was 
insufficient rationale to justify having such a broad-stroke rule.72 
Ultimately, Justice Fortas concluded that both Due Process Clause and 
Commerce Clause requirements were met, and declined to support the 
physical presence rule.73 
C.  Pragmatism Gains Ground 
Before it reexamined the physical presence rule in Quill, the Court took 
a much more affirmative step toward pragmatism through Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady.74 Specifically, Complete Auto overturned two 
pertinent decisions that supported formalistic interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause:75 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor and 
Freeman v. Hewit.76 Both of these decisions were valid jurisprudence 
 
extended to instances where the out-of-state company is engaged in exploiting the local market on 
a regular, systematic, large-scale basis.”); see also South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 
2094 (2018) (explaining that the physical presence rule puts “both local businesses and many 
interstate businesses with physical presence at a competitive disadvantage relative to remote 
sellers”). 
72. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 766 (explaining that local retailers will be subject to the same 
tax, and that if they were to engage in a remote market, they would be equally responsible for 
collecting and remitting that market’s tax if so required); see also Bellas Hess Brief for Appellee, 
supra note 52, at 37–38 (“We respectfully suggest that what [Bellas Hess], in the context of this 
case, and other mail order firms are attempting to do, is not eliminate a discrimination—allegedly 
directed at them—but perpetrate a present discrimination against local sellers.”). 
73. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 765–66 (“[I]t seems to me entirely clear that a mail order house 
engaged in the business of regularly, systematically, and on a large scale offering merchandise for 
sale in a State in competition with local retailers, and soliciting deferred-payment credit accounts 
from the State’s residents, is not excused from compliance with the State’s use tax obligations by 
the Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.”); see also Gen. Trading Co. 
v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 338 (1943) (“[T]he mere fact that property is used for interstate 
commerce or has come into an owner’s possession as a result of interstate commerce does not 
diminish the protection which it may draw from a State to the upkeep of which it may be asked to 
bear its fair share.”). 
74. See generally Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (observing the 
success of practical applications versus the arbitrary results of formal ones through jurisprudence 
and applying pragmatism in crafting a test for the validity of State legislation imposing tax duties 
on interstate commerce); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 (1992) (citing 
Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (“Complete Auto 
emphasized the importance of looking past ‘the formal language of the tax statute [to] its practical 
effect,’ and set forth a four-part test that continues to govern the validity of state taxes under the 
Commerce Clause.”). 
75. See generally Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) (applying the now-rejected formal 
analysis which differentiated between direct and indirect taxation); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. 
O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (applying the same rule). But see Spector Motor Serv., 340 U.S. at 
612 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (arguing that the application of Freeman to this case 
was incorrect and arguing that the tax in question “meets every practical test of fairness and 
propriety”). 
76. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. 288–89 (expressly overruling Spector and, by association, 
Freeman); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 309–10 (detailing the effect of Complete Auto on Commerce 
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when the Court decided Bellas Hess and undoubtedly influenced the 
Court’s formal interpretation.77 
Complete Auto was a Michigan corporation engaged in transporting 
vehicles by rail to Mississippi.78 A portion of this transport involved 
Complete Auto’s agents crossing into Mississippi to secure the transfer 
of goods by truck to their final destination in Mississippi.79 The State of 
Mississippi assessed a sales tax on Complete Auto based on the privilege 
of doing business within the State, so Complete Auto brought suit to 
recover taxes paid to Mississippi for various transports.80 
This case provided an example of technical physical presence in the 
taxing State, but did not squarely address physical presence as an issue.81 
Instead, Complete Auto focused on whether the Spector rule, that taxing 
the “privilege” of doing business in interstate commerce was per se 
invalid, should be applied to invalidate the Mississippi privilege tax.82 
Complete Auto’s argument against taxation was largely based on the rule 
from Spector, which stated that a tax on the “‘privilege’ of engaging in 
an activity in the State may not be applied to an activity that is part of 
interstate commerce.”83 The Court rejected this argument after tracing the 
language “privilege of doing business” through recent case law, proving 
two relevant findings: first, “the underlying philosophy to this idea is that 
interstate commerce should enjoy a sort of ‘free trade’ immunity from 
state taxation[;]”84 and second, the phrasing of this rule proved arbitrary 
 
Clause interpretation and the meaning of overturning Spector and Freeman). 
77. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756 (quoting Freeman, 329 U.S. at 253); see also Quill, 504 
U.S. at 310 (alluding to Freeman’s impact in pulling the Court back into an era of formal 
interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause). 
78. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 276; see also Brief of the Appellee at 5, Complete Auto Transit, 
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (No. 76-279), 1976 WL 194487, at *5 [hereinafter Complete 
Auto Brief for Appellee] (“The appellant, a Michigan corporation, had contracted with General 
Motors to haul certain motor vehicles from Jackson, Mississippi . . . .”). 
79. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 276; see also Complete Auto Brief for Appellee, supra note 78, 
at 5 (describing appellant as a hired distributor within the State of Mississippi, the state which 
levied the tax duties). 
80. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 276–77; Complete Auto Brief for Appellee, supra note 78, at 1. 
81. See generally Complete Auto, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); see also id. at 277 (citing Complete 
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 330 So.2d 268, 272 (Miss. 1976)) (briefly addressing the opinion of 
the State Supreme Court which eschewed the concerns of Bellas Hess that Complete Auto might 
be “smothered by cumulative taxes of several states.”). 
82. See generally Complete Auto, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); see also Spector Motor Serv. v. 
O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609 (1951) (“This Court heretofore has struck down, under the Commerce 
Clause, state taxes upon the privilege of carrying on a business that was exclusively interstate in 
character.”). 
83. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 278 (first citing Spector, 340 U.S. 602; and then citing Freeman 
v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946)). 
84. The underpinning of this philosophy is essentially anti-protectionism—the idea that 
interstate commerce is untouchable by states. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 278; see also JEROME R. 
638 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  51 
because it tested the formalism of written statutes, but not the effects of 
the statutes.85 The Court also compared precedent and determined this 
rule was unworkable because it created different outcomes in 
substantially similar situations.86 
To rectify these inconsistencies, the Court came up with a test that 
concerned the “practical effect” of taxes levied on interstate commerce, 
and declared that a tax would be sustained “against a Commerce Clause 
challenge when the tax (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial 
nexus with the taxing State, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the 
services provided by the State.”87 This test is still applied today when 
examining the link between a taxing state and the interstate transaction 
that it attempts to tax.88 
 
HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 4.11 (3d ed. 2001) (“[T]he Court 
repudiated the ‘underlying philosophy [of the Spector rule] that interstate commerce should enjoy 
a sort of “free trade” immunity from state taxation.’”). 
85. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288 (opining that the Court’s “focus on that formalism 
merely obscures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden effect” and that the Spector rule 
did not actually address the Commerce Clause concerns in the case at bar); see also Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 (1992) (detailing Complete Auto’s rejection of the Spector rule 
as a recognition that—under the rule—two “differently denominated tax[es] with the same 
economic effect” could lead court to a finding that one is constitutional and the other is 
unconstitutional). 
86. The Court determined that the Spector rule would have actually allowed for the tax in a 
nearly identical situation, all the legislature would have had to do was rename the tax without 
changing any of its pertinent features. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 285 (citing Nw. States 
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 464 (1959)) (“The reason for attaching 
constitutional significance to a semantic difference is difficult to discern.”); see also supra note 9 
(comparing Railway Express I and Railway Express II through Complete Auto, which recognized 
that there was no discernable economic difference between the tax in each of the Railway cases, 
but formal interpretation led the Court to different treatment of the tax). 
87. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279; Quill, 504 U.S. at 311. The first prong is the most relevant 
for the purposes of this note, as the physical presence rule essentially is a determination that the 
“substantial nexus with the taxing State” is defined, at minimum, by physical presence. See Quill, 
504 U.S. at 299 (citation omitted) (“[Bellas Hess] concerns the first part of the Complete Auto test 
and stands for the proposition that a vendor whose only contacts with the taxing State are by mail 
or common carrier lacks the ‘substantial nexus’ required by the Commerce Clause.”); see also 
South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018) (citing Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 
557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009)) (concluding, after having rejected the physical presence rule, that “the first 
prong of the Complete Auto test simply asks whether the tax applies to activity with a substantial 
nexus” which is established when the taxpayer avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying 
on business in that jurisdiction). 
88. See, e.g., Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091 (citing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. 274) (detailing the 
“now-accepted framework” laid by Complete Auto); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 310 (detailing that 
the four-part test from Complete Auto “continues to govern the validity of State taxes under the 
Commerce Clause). 
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The Complete Auto Court signaled the end of formalism in Commerce 
Clause interpretations in contemporary judicial review.89 However, the 
physical presence rule somehow managed to remain in good-standing 
through decades of the Court’s updated approach to interstate commerce 
issues.90 Justifications alleging the complexity remote sellers would face 
in determining where they were subject to tax,91 enhanced forms of stare 
decisis,92 and others have been cited in defense of the rule through the 
years.93 The Court endorsed these concerns in the first test of the physical 
 
89. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 310 (first citing Railway Express II, 358 U.S. 434, 441 (1959); and 
then citing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 281) (“Spector . . . created a situation in which ‘magic words 
or labels’ could ‘disable an otherwise constitutional levy.’ Complete Auto emphasized the 
importance of looking past ‘the formal language of the tax statute [to] its practical effect,’ and set 
forth a four-part test that continues to govern the validity of state taxes under the Commerce 
Clause.”); Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (explaining how the physical presence rule acts as a “tax 
shelter” for remote sellers who engage in out-of-state markets, thus creating an unfair competitive 
advantage which favors remote sellers over local businesses); see also Walter Hellerstein et. al., 
Commerce Clause Restraints on Taxation After Jefferson Lines, 51 TAX L. REV. 47, 48 (1995) 
(citations omitted) (“The Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in [Complete Auto] signaled a 
paradigmatic shift in the Court’s approach to state tax adjudication under the dormant Commerce 
Clause.”); PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 2.17 
(1981) (“After decades of distinctions based upon insubstantial and pointless formalism, in 1977 
the Court cut the Gordian knot in [Complete Auto].”). 
90. See generally Quill, 504 U.S. at 298 (applying the physical presence rule); see also Direct 
Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (first citing 
Direct Mktg., 814 F.3d at 1137 n.14 (majority opinion); then citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 319–20 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); then citing id. 321–33 (White, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); and then citing Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134–
35 (2015)) (“Everyone before us acknowledges that [the physical presence rule has] been the target 
of criticism over many years from many quarters, including from many members of the Supreme 
Court.”). 
91. The most commonly asserted justification rests on the risk of subjecting taxpayers to 
multiple taxation or complications in determining where they are subjected to jurisdiction at all. 
See, e.g., Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1967) (footnotes 
omitted) (“The many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and 
record-keeping requirements could entangle [Bellas Hess’s] interstate business in a virtual welter 
of complicated obligations . . . .”); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6 (explaining that the multiple 
tax jurisdictions within states would be too complicated to navigate for taxpayers); Wayfair, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2103 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (considering over ten thousand jurisdictions that levy taxes 
as a reason to maintain the physical presence rule). 
92. Another popular defense is that the rule justifies the application of an enhanced stare decisis. 
See Quill, 504 U.S. at 317–18 (explaining that “the continuing value of a bright-line rule in this 
area and the doctrine and principles of stare decisis indicate that” the rule remains good law, 
especially considering that the issue is one “that Congress may be better qualified to resolve”); see 
also Respondents’ Brief at 28, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494) 
[hereinafter Wayfair Respondents’ Brief] (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring)) 
(explaining that stare decisis “applies with enhanced strength with respect to the Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause decisions because Congress ‘remains free to alter what [the Court has] done’”). 
93. Some arguments have consisted of the reliance interest based on the rule’s breadth in 
jurisprudence. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2101 (“E-commerce has grown into a significant and 
vibrant part of our national economy against the backdrop of established rules, including the 
physical presence rule.”). Consider also the challenge it would take to overrule an area of law based 
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presence rule following the Complete Auto decision—Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota.94 
D.  Affirmation: Quill Corp. v. North Dakota 
In 1987, North Dakota amended the statutory definition of the term 
“retailer” to include remote sellers that regularly did business in North 
Dakota, thus requiring them to collect and remit a use tax.95 Quill was a 
corporation with no property or employees in North Dakota, though about 
$1 million of its $200 million in annual sales was attributable to sales 
made in North Dakota.96 After Quill refused to comply with the amended 
regulation, the North Dakota Tax Commissioner filed suit to seek 
enforcement.97 The trial court ruled in favor of Quill based on Bellas Hess 
as precedent, but the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed on the 
grounds that “wholesale changes” in the economy and law justified a 
departure from Bellas Hess.98 
Justice Stevens penned the opinion reversing the decision of the North 
Dakota Supreme Court and upholding Bellas Hess.99 The Court upheld 
only in part, and overruled any holdings that the Due Process Clause 
required physical presence for taxation.100 The Court explained that it 
 
on the Eleventh Amendment’s operation in this scope. See Trelease, supra note 12, at 18 (discussing 
the Eleventh Amendment’s restriction preventing suits against a State in federal court, forcing the 
issue to chance appeal to rise to the Supreme Court through the State’s various levels of appeal 
first). 
94. See generally Quill, 504 U.S. 298; Brief for Petitioner, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 
U.S. 298 (1992) (No. 91-494), 1991 WL 538773 [hereinafter Quill Brief for Petitioner]. 
95. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 302–03 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(6) (2019)). 
96. Id. at 302; see also Brief for Respondent at 3, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 
(1992) (No. 91-194), 1991 WL 538776, at *3 [hereinafter Quill Brief for Respondent] (quantifying 
Quill’s sales into North Dakota as “in excess of $970,000 during the tax periods at issue”). 
97. Quill, 504 U.S. at 303; Quill Brief for Respondent, supra note 96, at 2–3. 
98. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 303, 331 (stating that States were losing $3.2 billion in 1992 from a 
failure to collect sales and use taxes on transactions with remote sellers) (citing Quill Brief for 
Respondent, supra note 96, at 9); see also ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE MAIL-ORDER SALES: ESTIMATES OF REVENUE 
POTENTIAL 1990–1992, at 3 (1991) [hereinafter ACIR ESTIMATES OF REVENUE POTENTIAL] 
(showing that, considering their inability to collect on sales and use taxes of remote sellers direct-
marketing alone, states lost $3.08 billion in 1991 and that states were set to lose $3.27 billion in 
1992). 
99. Quill, 504 U.S. at 301–02; see also South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2087–
88 (2018) (explaining that Quill endorsed Bellas Hess’s holding to uphold the physical presence 
rule). 
100. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308 (explaining that the Due Process Clause is no longer sufficient 
justification to uphold the physical presence rule); see also Quill Brief for Respondent, supra note 
96, at 28 (first citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985); then citing World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980); then citing McGee v. Int’l 
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); and then citing Hust v. N. Log, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 429, 433 
(N.D. 1980)) (relying upon several cases which advanced the Court’s application of the Due 
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was common for meaningful business to be solely carried out by mail 
based on modern business practices.101 The Court also stated that there is 
“fair warning” to a corporation that directly aims its business at the forum 
state.102 Thus, the Due Process Clause could not prop up the physical 
presence rule.103 
The Court reversed the North Dakota Supreme Court and reaffirmed 
the physical presence rule based on Bellas Hess’s Commerce Clause 
justification.104 The Court compared the Due Process Clause and 
Commerce Clause and showed that the former is related to fair notice to 
the defendant, while the latter is concerned with regulating the national 
economy.105 Through this distinction, the Court explained that a 
corporation may have “minimum contacts” with a taxing state as the Due 
Process Clause requires, even though they simultaneously lack the 
“substantial nexus” with that state as the Commerce Clause requires 
under Complete Auto.106 The Court attempted to show that physical 
presence was a practical distinction between satisfying nexus in the 
context of the Commerce Clause versus the Due Process Clause, reaching 
the conclusion that only physical presence could satisfy Commerce 
Clause nexus under Complete Auto, while the Due Process Clause 
required less.107 
 
Process Clause in stating that it is “beyond argument that North Dakota courts could assert personal 
jurisdiction over Quill”). 
101. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308 (explaining that it is an “inescapable fact of modern commercial 
life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail”); see also id. (quoting Burger 
King, 471 U.S. at 476) (“So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward 
residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical 
contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.”). 
102. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308 (alterations in original) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 
186, 218 (1977)) (detailing that a corporation has “‘fair warning that [its] activity may subject [it] 
to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign’”). 
103. See id. (striking the Due Process Clause as justification for the physical presence rule). 
104. See id. at 318 (explaining that Bellas Hess is consistent with the Commerce Clause); see 
also Quill Brief for Petitioner, supra note 94, at 9 (“Any realignment of Commerce Clause 
applications is more suitably undertaken by Congress.”). 
105. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313; see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax Nexus and 
Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA. TAX REV. 1, 14 (2008) 
(“[D]istinguishing nexus under the Due Process Clause from nexus for Commerce Clause purposes 
and identifying Due Process nexus with economic presence and Commerce Clause nexus with 
physical presence—at least in use tax collection cases.”). 
106. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 (explaining that the different foundations of the Commerce 
Clause and Due Process Clause suggests that each will require an independent threshold for nexus). 
But see id. at 325 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Court has 
never made this distinction before). 
107. See id. at 312–13 (majority opinion) (disagreeing that the Complete Auto decision 
“undercut the Bellas Hess rule”); see also Quill Brief for Petitioner, supra note 94, at 14 (stating 
that the State’s application of the Complete Auto test “eviscerates both the first and fourth prongs” 
relating to nexus); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475–77 (1985) 
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Prior to Supreme Court review, the North Dakota Supreme Court had 
attempted to surpass the physical presence requirement by reasoning that 
the Supreme Court’s trend towards pragmatism supported a finding 
absent an application of the rule.108 In fact, Justice Stevens’s opinion 
briefly traced the history of the dormant Commerce Clause, and he too 
recognized the trend away from formal readings of tax issues.109 Still, the 
majority warily accepted the physical presence rule because Bellas Hess, 
in the opinion of the Court, did not specifically rely on the hyper-formal 
distinctions described in Spector and Freeman.110 
In a lengthy dissent, specifically against the majority’s interpretation 
of the dormant Commerce Clause, Justice White explained that the Court 
did not go far enough.111 He argued that though Freeman and Spector 
expressly denied the labels and “magic words” of formalistic language, 
the physical presence rule should also succumb to the Complete Auto 
rationale because it was wholly based on the notion that interstate 
commerce is immune to state taxation.112 Additionally, Justice White 
pointed out the Court had never before found that Due Process Clause 
nexus was satisfied without also satisfying Commerce Clause nexus.113 
 
(discussing the underpinnings of the Due Process Clause such as purposeful availment, minimum 
contacts, and other standards—many of which were endorsed by the Court after Bellas Hess).  
108. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 314 (citing North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 214 (N.D. 
1991)) (“The State Supreme Court reviewed our recent Commerce Clause decisions and concluded 
that those rulings signaled a ‘retreat from the formalistic constrictions of a stringent physical 
presence test in favor of a more flexible substantive approach’ and thus supported its decision not 
to apply Bellas Hess.”). 
109. See id. at 309–11 (first citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 285 
(1977); then citing Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); and then citing 
Railway Express II, 358 U.S. 434, 441 (1959)) (detailing a brief, but informative, history of the 
Supreme Court’s past interpretations of the dormant Commerce Clause surrounding limitations on 
taxation, and how the Court has abandoned distinguishing formal notions of direct versus indirect 
burdens or the “privilege of doing interstate business,” focused on a practical interpretation through 
the lens of the Complete Auto test); see also id. at 314 (expressing agreement with the State 
Supreme Court’s recognition of the trend towards pragmatism but declining to reach the same 
conclusion that the physical presence rule offends modern interpretations). 
110. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 310–11 (citing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 281) (differentiating the 
case at bar from Spector and Freeman because the physical presence rule was not vulnerable to 
exploitation by clever legislative language or allowing the validity of statutes to hinge on 
“‘draftsmanship and phraseology’”). 
111. See generally Quill, 504 U.S. 298 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see 
also South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(reminiscing that his complicity with the majority in Quill as a mistake). 
112. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 323 (citations omitted) (citing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288) 
(“What we disavowed in Complete Auto was not just the ‘formal distinction between “direct” and 
“indirect” taxes on interstate commerce,’ but also the whole notion underlying the Bellas Hess 
physical-presence rule—that ‘interstate commerce is immune from state taxation.’”). 
113. See id. at 325 (“The Court freely acknowledges that there is no authority for this novel 
interpretation of our cases and that we have never before found, as we do in this case, sufficient 
contacts for due process purposes but an insufficient nexus under the Commerce Clause.”); see also 
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Justice White next analyzed the background of the Complete Auto test’s 
nexus requirement to show it was substantially grounded in the Due 
Process Clause and that such a distinction between the requirements is 
meaningless.114 
Ultimately, Justice White rested his argument on logic.115 The physical 
presence rule, even before the modern e-commerce boom, was dated in 
light of the economic realities of contemporary business practices.116 He 
detailed the rule’s indifferent permission to businesses to exploit a 
judicially-created loophole at states’ disadvantage on an otherwise lawful 
opportunity to tax.117 But his opinion, while correct in hindsight, stood in 
the majority’s shadow for another quarter-century.118 
II.  RETURN TO FORM 
The Wayfair Court overturned the physical presence rule for three 
reasons: it is an unnecessary hold on state’s ability to tax interstate 
commerce, it creates market distortions, and its formal background 
contradicts contemporary Commerce Clause precedent.119 The Court 
 
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (“Quill imposes the sort of arbitrary, formalistic distinction that the 
Court’s modern Commerce Clause precedents disavow.”). 
114. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 327–28 (detailing the history of the Complete Auto nexus 
requirement which contains a strong background in Due Process rationale without reference to 
Commerce Clause concerns); see also id. at 327 (“For the Court now to assert that our Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence supports a separate notion of nexus is without precedent or explanation.”). 
115. See id. at 329 (“The majority clings to the physical-presence rule not because of any logical 
relation to fairness or any economic rationale related to principles underlying the Commerce 
Clause, but simply out of the supposed convenience of having a bright-line rule.”); see also Quill 
Brief for Respondent, supra note 96, at 24 (“[L]ogic compels common application of the same 
minimum contacts standards to personal and taxing jurisdiction questions.”). 
116. See generally Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. at 760–66 (1967) 
(Fortas, J., dissenting); see also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (“These critiques underscore that the 
physical presence rule, both as first formulated and as applied today, is an incorrect interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause.”). 
117. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 329 (describing the majority’s opinion as “perpetuating a rule that 
creates an interstate tax shelter for one form of business”); see also Quill Brief for Respondent, 
supra note 96, at 17–18 (quoting North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 215 (N.D. 1991)) 
(detailing that the rule gives remote sellers a competitive advantage to local sellers, comparing it a 
“sword to carve out a tax-free mail order niche”). 
118. See generally Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (overruling the physical presence rule); see also 
Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(“Everyone before us acknowledges that Quill is among the most contentious of all dormant 
commerce clause cases.”). 
119. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (citations omitted) (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
Quill is flawed on its own terms. First, the physical presence rule is not a necessary 
interpretation of the requirement that a state tax must be “applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State.” Second, Quill creates rather than resolves 
market distortions. And third, Quill imposes the sort of arbitrary, formalistic distinction 
that the Court’s modern Commerce Clause precedents disavow. 
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also referenced the dawn of internet technology, reasoning that it lessens 
the burden of compliance upon remote sellers to collect and remit tax to 
the State.120 The thrust of the Court’s opinion focused on the harmful 
effects of the rule.121 As explained below, the Court dissected the 
physical presence rule to show that its fundamentally flawed origin 
yielded unconstitutional results.122 
A.  Facts 
Before Wayfair, the South Dakota legislature enacted S.B. 106 (“the 
Act”), which required out-of-state sellers with no employees or real estate 
within South Dakota to collect and remit a sales tax on all transactions 
consummated within the state.123 The legislature deemed the Act a 
necessary emergency response to the state’s eroding tax base.124 The Act 
limited the requirement to collect and remit the sales tax to those remote 
sellers that, on an annual basis, deliver more than $100,000 of goods or 
services into the State, or engage in two hundred or more separate 
transactions for the delivery of goods or services into the state.125 S.B. 
106 directly challenged the physical presence rule, and the South Dakota 
legislature fully anticipated Supreme Court review, evidenced by 
provisions that placed a hold on its effect while waiting for a judicial 
verdict on its constitutionality.126 
Respondents were three of the leading remote sellers in South Dakota, 
none of which collected the required sales tax.127 The three parties, 
Wayfair, Inc., Overstock.com, Inc., and Newegg, Inc., all met the 
minimum requirements of the act.128 
 
Id. 
120. See id. (first citing LAFFER & ARDUIN, supra note 14, at 4; and then citing Hellerstein, 
Deconstructing the Debate Over State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
549, 553 (2000)) (“Quill created an inefficient ‘online sales tax loophole’ that gives out-of-state 
businesses an advantage. And ‘while nexus rules are clearly necessary,’ the Court ‘should focus on 
rules that are appropriate to the twenty-first century, not the nineteenth.’”). 
121. See generally Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080; Wayfair Respondents’ Brief, supra note 92. 
122. See infra Section II.C (detailing the majority’s opinion in Wayfair); see generally Wayfair, 
138 S. Ct. 2080. 
123. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-1 (2019); see also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088–89. 
124. § 10-64-1; see Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088 (drafting the Act because it was “necessary for 
the support of the state government and its existing public institutions”); see also Wayfair U.S. 
Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 5 (quoting 2016 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 70 § 8, at 217) (“An Act to 
provide for the collection of sales taxes from certain remote sellers, to establish certain Legislative 
findings, and to declare an emergency.”). 
125. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2018), invalidated by Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080; see also 
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089. 
126. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-4 (2019); see also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089. 
127. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089; State v. Wayfair, Inc., 901 N.W.2d 754, 756 n.3 (S.D. 2017). 
128. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089; see also Wayfair, 901 N.W.2d at 759–60 (citations omitted) 
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B.  Procedural History 
South Dakota filed for a declaratory judgment against the respondents 
in state court pursuant to the Act.129 The respondents moved for summary 
judgment, arguing the Act was unconstitutional based on Quill, and the 
trial court granted the motion.130 The South Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision on direct review, though it 
acknowledged the persuasiveness of the State’s arguments.131 
Specifically, the South Dakota Supreme Court accepted that the physical 
presence rule was inconsistent with the remainder of the United States 
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause precedent and yielded inconsistent 
results.132 
C.  Majority Opinion 
The Court began its opinion by addressing the physical presence rule’s 
origin.133 After a brief description of what sales and use taxes are,134 and 
a recitation of the facts, the Court began its dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis.135 It detailed the history of the Court’s understanding of states’ 
ability to regulate interstate commerce from its earliest precedent through 
modern law.136 The Court found that states may regulate interstate 
 
(“[E]ach lacked a physical presence in South Dakota; each met the sales and transaction 
requirements for application of [the Act]; and none were registered to collect South Dakota sales 
tax.”). 
129. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089; Wayfair, 901 N.W.2d at 756. 
130. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089; Wayfair, 901 N.W.2d at 756. 
131. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089 (quoting Wayfair, 901 N.W.2d at 761) (“However persuasive 
the State’s arguments on the merits of revisiting the issue, Quill has not been overruled [and] 
remains the controlling precedent on the issue of Commerce Clause limitations on interstate 
collection of sales and use taxes.”). 
132. Id. at 2089; see also Wayfair, 901 N.W.2d at 761 (“The State also claims that the Supreme 
Court’s application of the physical presence requirement to the collection of sales tax differs from 
its application of other Commerce Clause requirements to similar collection obligations. This has 
led to inconsistent results.”). 
133. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087–88 (“The Court granted certiorari here to reconsider the 
scope and validity of the physical presence rule mandated by [Bellas Hess and Quill].”). 
134. The Court explains that South Dakota enforced a sales tax on transactions and assigned 
seller’s the responsibility of collecting and remitting this tax. Id. at 2088. If the seller were to refuse 
to collect and remit the tax, the responsibility would shift to the consumer to pay a use tax on the 
transaction, a decisively less reliable schema. See id. (quoting Nat’l Geographic Soc. v. Cal. Bd. of 
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 555 (1977) (“[T]he impracticability of [this] collection from the 
multitude of individual purchasers is obvious.”); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text 
(detailing the difference between sales taxes and use taxes). 
135. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–36 
(1979)) (beginning an analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause by addressing its purpose as 
preventing “economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies”). 
136. See id. at 2089–91 (first citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 6 (1824); and then citing D.H. 
Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988)) (detailing the history of the Commerce Clause 
from 1824 through modern precedent). 
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commerce only to the point that such regulation does not discriminate 
against, or impose undue burdens upon, interstate commerce.137 The 
purpose is to ensure that states have an adequate ability to manage local 
interest, while not intruding on Congress’s plenary control of interstate 
commerce.138 
The Court’s limitation on burdensome or discriminatory legislation 
foreshadowed its examination of the Complete Auto test.139 The Court 
began at the test’s first prong, and investigated what threshold 
requirements for substantial nexus actually looked like in 
jurisprudence.140 The Court acknowledged that the requirements of Due 
Process and the Commerce Clause are not the same, but noted their 
shared aspects, particularly when examining a substantial nexus.141 After 
a brief look at Bellas Hess and Quill, the Court noted that Quill 
recognized the arbitrary distinction between the origins of Complete 
Auto’s nexus requirement and notice requirements under the Due Process 
Clause.142 With this background set, the Court comfortably stated that 
since its inception, the physical presence rule has stood starkly out of 
place in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.143 
 
137. See id. at 2090–91 (“Modern precedents rest upon two primary principles that mark the 
boundaries of a State’s authority to regulate interstate commerce. First, state regulations may not 
discriminate against interstate commerce; and second, States may not impose undue burdens on 
interstate commerce.”). 
138. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.137, 142 
(1970)) (explaining that the Court will focus on the State’s ability to “even-handedly” legislate to 
pursue its legitimate interests while not infringing upon congressional territory). 
139. The Complete Auto test’s second and third prongs ensure that the State’s regulation of 
interstate commerce is both “fairly apportioned” and “does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce.” Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); see also Quill Corp. 
v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992) (“The second and third parts of [the Complete Auto test] 
require fair apportionment and non-discrimination, prohibit taxes that pass an unfair share of the 
tax burden onto interstate commerce.”). Though the Court expresses this boundary upon states’ 
ability to regulate, the substance of its analysis handles the first prong which focuses on nexus. See 
generally Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080; see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 (detailing that the first and 
fourth prongs of the test require substantial nexus). 
140. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (“[T]he requirements of due process are met irrespective 
of a corporation’s lack of physical presence in the state.”); see generally Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954). 
141. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (quoting Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 
U.S. 752, 756 (1967)) (noting that the nexus requirements between the Due Process Clause and 
Commerce Clause are “closely related”); see also Hellerstein et al., supra note 89, at 70 (separating 
his analysis of due process and interstate commerce requirements except for nexus, which he 
considers with due process). 
142. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 311–13) (noting that Quill 
recognized that the physical presence rule likely would not have been created had Bellas Hess been 
decided before Complete Auto, but “nevertheless, the Quill majority concluded that the physical 
presence rule was necessary”). 
143. See id. (“Each year, the physical presence rule becomes further removed from economic 
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The majority accentuated the fact that Quill recognized parallels to the 
Due Process Clause, but that it rested on the fact that parallels do not 
equal identical standards and failed to adequately address whether 
physical presence would be required by the Commerce Clause.144 Quill 
instead drew the line between the Due Process and Commerce Clause 
thresholds at physical presence.145 As an example of the arbitrary effect 
this had, the Court explained that several hundred salespersons in one 
state with internet access made no difference to a company’s ability to 
transact in any state under modern constraints when compared to one 
salesperson in every state.146 
Turning to its next point, the Court explained that the purpose of the 
Commerce Clause is to foster a thriving national economy, and not to 
excuse those engaged in interstate commerce from their share of 
taxation.147 It also recognized that the physical presence rule is an 
extraordinary imposition on interstate commerce regulation, directly 
defying Commerce Clause principles.148 The Court described market 
distortions created by the physical presence rule and how it exhibits a 
 
reality and results in significant revenue losses to the States. These critiques underscore that the 
physical presence rule, both as first formulated and as applied today, is an incorrect interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause.”); see also Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (explaining that the physical presence rule has “been the target of 
criticism over many years from many quarters”). 
144. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (detailing the history of substantial nexus under and how 
Quill recognized that this nexus was satisfied without physical presence under the Due Process 
Clause); see also id. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“I agree that Bellas Hess was wrongly 
decided, for many of the reasons given by the Court.”). 
145. While the Court conceded that Quill analyzed Due Process concerns finding physical 
presence as unnecessary to establish nexus, it did not reverse the question upon the Commerce 
Clause. See id. at 2093 (majority opinion) (“The reasons given in Quill for rejecting the physical 
presence rule for due process purposes apply as well to the question whether physical presence is 
a requisite for an out-of-state seller’s liability to remit sales taxes. Physical presence is not necessary 
to create a substantial nexus.”); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 325 (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (describing the Quill Court’s comparative analysis of the Due Process and 
Commerce Clauses as “an uncharted and treacherous foray”). 
146. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093; see Reply Brief at 14, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. 
Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494) [hereinafter Wayfair Reply Brief] (“Under Quill’s odd rule, that 
unintentional, minor, and arbitrary physical presence suffices.”). 
147. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093–94 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first citing 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978); and then citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. 
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 (1977)). 
The Court has consistently explained that the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent 
States from engaging in economic discrimination so they would not divide into isolated, 
separable units. But it is “not the purpose of the [C]ommerce [C]lause to relieve those 
engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden.” 
Id. 
148. See id. at 2095–96 (explaining the massive implication the physical presence rule has on 
interstate commerce and the major boundary it sets in front of states seeking collection of a just 
tax); see also Wayfair Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 12 (“Quill is far too overbroad to retain.”). 
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preference towards remote sellers.149 The rule created, rather than 
prevented, market distortions by encouraging fewer storefronts and 
discouraging the physical growth of companies.150 In a practical sense, 
that geographically-removed businesses were excused from tax 
collection in states which they meaningfully engaged with defied logic 
and encouraged bad faith in business practice.151 The Court noted that 
Wayfair itself engaged in this sort of behavior, advertising lower prices 
and more attractive offers based on its ability to omit sales taxes from 
prices.152 
Moving to its third point, the Court highlighted the formalistic logic 
the rule endorsed—something the Court did away with a long time 
ago.153 The Court relied on an example to prove this point, in which two 
businesses sell furniture remotely. One business had a small warehouse 
in South Dakota, unrelated to any sales it made in the state, and the other 
had a major warehouse that contributed to South Dakota sales just across 
the border in North Dakota.154 Based on the locations of their 
warehouses, the first business would collect and remit a sales tax, even 
though the items sold were unrelated to the warehouse, while the second 
business would owe no sales tax.155 This forces an arbitrary tax against 
 
149. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (describing the physical presence rule as a “tax shelter for 
business”); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 329 (describing the physical presence rule as an “interstate 
tax shelter for one form of business . . . but [one with] no countervailing advantage for its 
competitors”). 
150. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (“Rejecting the physical presence rule is necessary to 
ensure that artificial competitive advantages are not created by this Court’s precedents.”); see also 
Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (acknowledging that the rule that it was endorsing was “artificial at its 
edges”). 
151. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (detailing that the rule creates an incentive to avoid 
presence in a State solely to reduce prices below that of brick and mortar competitors); see also 
Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288 (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 
(1938)) (detailing that it is “not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in 
interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden”). 
152. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096 (describing Wayfair’s advertisement of reduced taxation 
as a “subtle offer to assist in tax evasion”). 
153. This formalistic viewpoint was abandoned even before the rule itself was crafted. See 
Quill, 504 U.S. at 309–11 (detailing the history of the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause and noting that Bellas Hess was penned as the Court’s precedent regarding the Commerce 
Clause shift towards pragmatism); see also supra note 9 (referencing Complete Auto, which noted 
that the Court’s formal approach towards testing State legislation allowed for careful drafting of 
laws to circumvent Commerce Clause restrictions); Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (citing W. Lynn 
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994)) (“The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
has ‘eschewed formalism for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and effects.’”). 
154. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094; see Wayfair Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 7 (recognizing 
the same distortions that this example points out and concluding that it treats identical actors 
differently “based on the wholly arbitrary fact that some have a footprint in one corner of States as 
large as California”). 
155. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (detailing the arbitrary nature of the physical presence 
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the former business because the sales are unrelated to property or 
employees within the state.156 From an economic standpoint this example 
demonstrated that the physical presence rule treated businesses making 
the same amount of money in the same state differently.157 
Moreover, the Court added that the rule defied the Commerce Clause 
by ignoring realistic considerations.158 A practical reading of the rule 
reveals unanswered questions on either side of the bright line, chief 
among them—why is physical presence a necessary threshold?159 
Neither Bellas Hess nor Quill sought to answer this question, and the 
Court asked several more that the rule could not answer.160 
The Court ended its analysis with the determination that the physical 
presence rule was too great of an error to let stand because the rule’s 
foundation was flawed on its own terms.161 It reasoned that the 
constitutional default rule prevented the Court from asking Congress to 
change a rule when the rule itself was created through judicial 
 
rule’s effect as it levies a tax upon one business, who may even be more actively engaged in the 
market, but not another only a few miles away only because the latter holds no property or agents, 
relevant to the transaction or otherwise, in the state in question); see also Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. 
Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1150–51 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (explaining that this 
“guarantees a competitive advantage to certain firms simply because of the organizational form 
they choose”). 
156. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (“This distinction simply makes no sense.”); see also Nat’l 
Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556 (1977) (confirming that physical 
presence entirely unrelated to the sale of goods into a jurisdiction will satisfy the rule). 
157. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (showing that the rule “treats economically identical actors 
differently, and for arbitrary reasons”); see also Wayfair Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 14–15 
(explaining that the physical presence rule is “logically arbitrary”). 
158. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095 (explaining that the rule should be, but is not, concerned 
with the actual practical effect it has on the market rather than formalistic distinctions for nothing 
other than the sake of drawing a clear line in interpreting the Commerce Clause); see also Quill, 
504 U.S. at 330–31 (detailing that it is “very doubtful” that the Court’s bright-line rule will actually 
create firm boundaries that reduce litigation). 
159. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095 (postulating that the physical presence rule’s lack of clarity 
in jurisprudence will further manifest as to why “a single employee or a single warehouse should 
create a substantial nexus while ‘physical’ aspects of pervasive modern technology should not”); 
see also Wayfair Reply Brief, supra note 146 at 14–15 (discussing questions that the Court’s will 
likely face in defining the limits of physical presence in conjunction with modern technological 
advancements). 
160. The Court referenced Quill, which stated that a few floppy diskettes in the state would fail 
to establish physical presence for tax purposes but failed to say why. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095 
(citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 315). Applying a more modern example, the Court ponders whether a 
business’s website leaving cookies on a user’s browser would satisfy property in the user’s state. 
Id. 
161. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096–97 (explaining that the Court is at fault for the rules 
existence in the first place, robbing Congress of its plenary power regardless of its silence on 
adjusting the rule); see also Wayfair Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 21 (asserting that Respondents 
misunderstand that Congress’s plenary power is infringed upon by the existence of the judicially 
created physical presence rule). 
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interpretation.162 As a doctrine of its own creation, reversing the physical 
presence rule did not limit the lawful prerogatives of Congress; stare 
decisis was the only thing that stood in the way.163 The dramatically 
different technological landscape of today means that access to interstate 
sales burdened states unlike in the past, pushing significant portions of 
their tax base out of lawful reach.164 The Court highlighted states’ 
struggle to cope with the rule in attempts to reclaim some of their 
declining transaction-based taxes, crafting unworkable solutions that 
might subject courts to frivolous litigation.165 Reliance interests, the 
Court reasoned, simply did not supersede the harm of the physical 
presence rule.166 
The Court concluded by defining the new, practical threshold for 
substantial nexus with the taxing state as when a taxpayer or collector 
“avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in that 
jurisdiction.”167 Under this standard, S.B. 106 passed the first prong of 
Complete Auto with ease.168 Though it did not squarely address the 
remainder of the Complete Auto test on appeal, the Court hypothesized 
 
162. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096 (“It is inconsistent with the Court’s proper role to ask 
Congress to address a false constitutional premise of this Court’s own creation.”); see also Wayfair 
Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 22 (“Relatedly, it is unfair to read Congress’s failure to intervene 
as reflecting implicit support for Quill.”). 
163. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096–97; see Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134–
35 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (detailing the several technological advancements that lend to 
overturning the physical presence rule, using States’ efforts and failures to legislate around the rule 
as evidence). 
164. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2097 (first citing Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors and 
Economists in Support of Petitioner at 11 n.7, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) 
(No. 17-494) [hereinafter Wayfair Law Professors and Economists Amici Curiae]; and then citing 
SALES TAXES REPORT, supra note 12, at 11–12) (demonstrating that e-commerce sales are expected 
to reduce states’ taxable income by up to $33 million dollars, a number up to ten times as high as 
the sales lost in 1992 under Quill). 
165. States crafted imaginative examples in desperate attempts to reclaim sales tax revenue, and 
the Court relished the thought of handling these proposed statutes in Court when a simpler solution 
existed. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2097–98; see also Brief for Tax Foundation as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Neither Party at 26–27, South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494) 
[hereinafter Wayfair Tax Foundation Amicus Curiae] (detailing examples of three states which 
created threshold requirements similar or identical to South Dakota’s). 
166. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798, 824 (1982)) (stating that “stare decisis accommodates only ‘legitimate reliance 
interest[s]’”). 
167. This new standard relinquishes the distinction between the first prong of the Complete Auto 
test and its Due Process Clause origins. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (citing Polar Tankers, Inc. v. 
City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009)). 
168. See id. at 2099 (“Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and 
virtual contacts respondents have with the State.”). 
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that the test would be satisfied based on the adequate safeguards the Act 
offered to interstate commerce through small business protection.169 
D.  Concurrences 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence voiced no opposition to major points of 
the Court’s opinion, rather, he wrote separately to reflect on his 
participation in the Quill majority. He compared himself to Justice White, 
who helped solidify the physical presence rule in Bellas Hess, but 
eventually saw his error by the time the Court was able to substantively 
reevaluate it.170 
Justice Gorsuch started his opinion by reasserting the majority’s stance 
that the sales tax imposed by South Dakota did not discriminate or unduly 
burden interstate commerce, rather it evened the playing field between 
local business and interstate commerce.171 However, he also made a point 
to voice his tentative disagreement with the Court’s examination of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.172 Ultimately, neither Justice Thomas, nor 
Justice Gorsuch sought to amend any of the substantive findings of the 
Court’s opinion.173 
E.  Roberts’s Dissent 
Chief Justice Roberts began his dissent discussing the stare decisis 
concerns of the Court, and then argued that the economic magnitude of 
this decision should disqualify the Court from overruling Quill so that 
Congress may address it instead.174 Roberts believed that stare decisis 
 
169. The threshold requirements for meeting taxable minimums under the Act are well-known 
as Safe Harbor provisions. See infra Part IV (defining Safe Harbor provisions under the Streamlined 
Sales and Use Tax Agreement); see also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2100 (specifically referring to the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement as an adequate body for lessening the cost of compliance 
with the Court’s decision). 
170. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 333 (1992)) (“And like Justice White, a quarter century of experience has 
convinced me that Bellas Hess and Quill ‘can no longer be rationally justified.’”). 
171. See id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Direct Marketing Ass’n. v. Brohl, 814 F.3d, 1129, 
1150 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)) (explaining that the advantage offered directly 
disadvantages local sellers). 
172. See id. at 2100–01 (“Meanwhile our dormant commerce cases suggest Article III courts 
may invalidate state laws that offend no congressional statute. Whether and how much of this can 
be squared with the text of the Commerce Clause, justified by stare decisis, or defended as 
misbranded products of federalism or antidiscrimination imperatives flowing from Article IV’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause are questions for another day.”). 
173. See generally id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
174. Id. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). But see id. (“I agree that Bellas Hess was wrongly 
decided, for many of the reasons given by the Court.”). 
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demanded “special justification,”175 especially when Congress exercises 
primary authority that can override Court precedent.176 He cited the 
Court’s prior deference in context of the dormant Commerce Clause.177 
Essentially, Roberts opined that the Court’s deference to Congress’ 
plenary power in the realm of Commerce Clause jurisprudence meant that 
the Court should not venture to overturn a decision that would greatly 
affect the national economy.178 
Roberts also believed that the majority rushed into its decision without 
apt consideration of the economic effect.179 He argued that between 87–
96 percent of the taxes from internet retailers is collected already, and 
that the number would likely grow as the industry evolved and began to 
solve the problem itself.180 He then spoke to the “likely baffling” 
challenges the decision creates for retailers who have to cater to more 
than ten thousand jurisdictions that levy sales taxes.181 
III.  WHAT WENT WRONG 
This Part will examine physical presence rule precedent and dissect the 
Court’s rationale in Bellas Hess, Quill, and then Wayfair.182 This will 
show that the foundation for the rule is flawed,183 the rule is 
unworkable,184 and that modern realities require a rejection of the rule.185 
This Part will also briefly address contentions of the Respondents that 
 
175. See id. (citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 
320 (Scalia, J., concurring) (detailing that stare decisis applies with “special force” in areas where 
Congress has plenary power to regulate). 
176. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Michigan v. Bay Mills 
Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014)). 
177. Id. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing S. Pac. Co. v. Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 
761, 770 (1945)). 
178. See generally id. at 2101–02 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
179. See id. at 2103 (“The Court proceeds with an inexplicable sense of urgency.”). 
180. See id. (explaining that the magnitude of this decision is larger than the problem which the 
majority claims existed) (citing to SALES TAX REPORT, supra note 12, at 8). 
181. The Chief Justice nearly mimics the language applied by the Bellas Hess majority fifty 
years earlier. See id. (stating that the majority undersells the hardship that retailers will face in 
coping with the many tax jurisdictions that they now have to be aware of); see also Nat’l Bellas 
Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1967) (describing this same concern 
as a risk that might “entangle” businesses “in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local 
jurisdictions”). 
182. See infra Sections III.A–C (analyzing the opinions of the three cases which most squarely 
deal with the physical presence rule). 
183. See infra Section III.A (analyzing Bellas Hess which founded the physical presence rule). 
184. See infra Section III.B (analyzing the Quill decision which justified the physical presence 
rule in contradiction to the Court’s contemporary interpretation of the rule which yielded harmful 
results). 
185. See infra Section III.C (analyzing the Wayfair decision which displays the exacerbated 
effect of a formal rule in the modern economy, high-lighting that the rule is out of place). 
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likely factored into the Court’s pause in addressing this issue over the last 
fifty years.186 Finally, this Part will explain that Wayfair has provided a 
return to form in a traditionally foggy area of constitutional law.187 
A.  National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois 
First, a word of understanding: The Court in Bellas Hess was at an 
obvious disadvantage to its physical presence rule progeny—it lacked the 
later-developed constitutional tools, interpretations, and understandings 
of Due Process and Commerce Clause rationale.188 The fact that the 
Court did not yet have the Complete Auto test itself speaks to the 
disadvantage between the Court’s comparisons of threshold limitations 
on taxing interstate commerce.189 However, it remains that the Court was 
able to find a more workable decision with the case law that it had.190 
The very foundation of the dormant Commerce Clause in Supreme Court 
precedent explained that when Congress fails to regulate interstate 
commerce, states can fill in the blanks.191 Bellas Hess fell in line with a 
dying trend of judicial interpretation that had lost sight of this purpose, 
misconstruing burdens upon interstate commerce that reflected a similar 
deference to cases like Scripto and Freeman, without adequately 
analyzing what that precedent meant and how to interpret it.192 With a 
 
186. See infra Section III.C (analyzing the Respondents’ concerns and dispelling them). 
187. See infra Section III.C (detailing how the decision restores logic to this area of law). 
188. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (detailing the now-
accepted standard that “purposefully directed” efforts of an actor at another state satisfy due process 
concerns); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (“Our due process 
jurisprudence has evolved substantially in the 25 years since Bellas Hess.”); Quill Brief for 
Respondent, supra note 96, at 23 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474) (defining the minimum 
contacts rationale of Burger King as the “touchstone” in defining nexus for due process). 
189. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (detailing the four-
pronged test to establish threshold limits on taxation under the Commerce Clause); see also South 
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018) (citing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. 274) (“The 
Court explained the now-accepted framework for state taxation in [Complete Auto].”); Quill, 504 
U.S. at 310 (detailing that Complete Auto “govern[s] the validity of state taxes under the Commerce 
Clause”). 
190. See, e.g., Ctr. Greyhound Lines of N.Y. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 661 (1948) (“[T]he real 
question [is] whether what the State is exacting is a constitutionally fair demand by the State for 
that aspect of the interstate commerce which the State bears a special relation.”); see also Wisconsin 
v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) (emphasis added) (“A state is free to pursue its own 
fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical operation of a tax the State 
has exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has given . . . to benefits which it has 
conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society.”) 
191. Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232, 249 (1872). 
192. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 765 (1967) (Fortas, 
J., dissenting) (“The present case is, of course, not at all controlled by [Miller Bros.].”); see also 
Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 338 (1944) (emphasis added) (“[T]he mere 
fact that property is used for interstate commerce or has come into an owner’s possession as a result 
of interstate commerce does not diminish the protection which he may draw from a State to the 
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proper evaluation of jurisprudence, the rule should not have been 
formulated.193 
The Court correctly relied on Scripto to determine that physical 
presence in a State is always sufficient to establish nexus.194 However, 
with little rationale in support, the Court propped up Miller Bros. as an 
opposite extreme in order to start working towards a rule somewhere in 
the middle.195 This is where the Court erred. The comparison between 
the two cases was incorrect, as Justice Frankfurter noted in his 
concurrence in Scripto.196 Miller Bros. involved a business engaged in 
no meaningful solicitation other than occasional and indirect 
advertising,197 whereas Bellas Hess made over $2 million from Illinois in 
only fifteen months.198 While understanding that physical presence is 
always sufficient, the Court struggled with defining a limitation relating 
to state taxation of remote sellers and so it opted to accept physical 
presence as that boundary.199 
 
upkeep of which does not diminish the protection which he may be asked to bear his fair share. But 
a fair share precludes legislation obviously hostile or practically discriminatory toward interstate 
commerce.”). This rhetoric was soon overturned in Complete Auto the following decade. See 
generally Complete Auto, 430 U.S. 274. 
193. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (“[T]he physical presence rule, both as first formulated 
and as applied today, is an incorrect interpretation of the Commerce Clause.”). Even those who 
endorse the rule agree that it was formulated incorrectly. See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (admitting 
that “contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were it to 
arise for the first time today”); Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (similarly 
admitting that “Bellas Hess was wrongly decided”); see also Cushman, supra note 3, at 1089 
(explaining that formalism had begun its decline in the late 1930s). 
194. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 757–58 (citing Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211 
(1960)) (detailing the holding in Scripto, which demonstrated nexus when ten salesmen were in the 
taxing state); see also Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 345 (1954) (“Thus, the Court 
has frequently held that domicile or residence . . . is an adequate basis for taxation . . . .”). 
195. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758 (balancing the holding in Miller Bros. against Scripto to 
show that the Court had never imposed use tax collection on sellers “whose only connection with 
customers in the State is by common carrier or United States mail”). As mentioned below, Justice 
Frankfurter disagreed with the Scripto Court’s application of Miller Bros. to the case, and instead 
favored an application of General Trading. See infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing 
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Scripto). General Trading followed a similar set of facts to 
Bellas Hess, except the tax duty levied was collection of a use tax, and there was a physical presence 
established by traveling salesmen for General Trading. See Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 336–37. 
196. See Scripto, 362 U.S. at 213 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (deeming Scripto to be “nearer 
to General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 335, than it is to [Miller Bros.]”); see 
also Brief for the Appellees at 7, Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) (No. 80) [hereinafter 
Scripto Brief for Appellees] (describing Miller Bros. as “so dissimilar and so clearly distinguishable 
from the facts of [Scripto] that it can in no way be controlling”). 
197. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 765 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (citing Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 347).  
198. See id. at 761 (“[Bellas Hess’s] sales in Illinois amounted to $2,174,744 . . . .”). 
199. See id. at 758 (majority opinion) (noting that states had “generally recognized” that 
physical presence was a requirement and so applied it formally as judicial interpretation); see also 
id. at 758 n.11 (citing State v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 277 Ala. 385 (1965)) (applying the Alabama 
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Instead, the Court should have recognized the economic effect of 
Bellas Hess’s actual systematic exploitation of Illinois’s consumer 
market.200 The State offered more than enough in return under Bellas 
Hess, providing the business with a market of consumers who drew credit 
from local institutions and applied it to transactions with Bellas Hess.201 
Bellas Hess would not have been able to conduct business in that very 
same consumer market had those consumers been unable to rely on the 
several banking and credit institutions in Illinois because the consumers 
would not have been able to draw credit to make transactions.202 The 
mass market of consumers furnished by Illinois, that Bellas Hess did 
business with, is a sufficient reason to justify imposing a duty on the 
business.203 In this scenario, local businesses do not receive any other 
benefits aside from closer access to customers, but that benefit is offset 
by the substantial sales recorded by remote sellers.204 This is adverse to 
 
Supreme Court’s decision that a similar tax schema would fail to pass constitutional muster). 
200. See id. at 762 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (citing Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 347) (“[Bellas Hess]is 
not simply using the facilities of interstate commerce to serve customers in Illinois. It is regularly 
and continuously engaged in ‘exploitation of the consumer market’ . . . .”); see also David F. Shores, 
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Quill, Allied Signal and a Proposal, 72 NEB. L. REV. 682, 
689 (1993) (describing Justice Fortas’ “vigorous dissent” in Bellas Hess). 
201. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 761–62 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (explaining that the assistance 
in establishing lines of credit with Bellas Hess by Illinois banking and lending institutions should 
be considered sufficient); see also Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 446 (1940) 
(“[G]overnment is the prerequisite for the fruits of civilization for which, as Mr. Justice Holmes 
was fond of saying, we pay taxes.”). 
202. This argument does not contend that Bellas Hess’s transactions demonstrate nexus because 
the customers pay with credit, rather, it hinges on the fact that Bellas Hess opened lines of credit 
with its customers in Illinois and those customers were referenced by the various banking and 
lending institutions within the State which aided directly in establishing credit for the transaction. 
Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 761–62 (Fortas, J., dissenting); see South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. 
Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018) (applying this distinction to the modern standard reveals that Bellas Hess 
would obviously satisfy the standard for nexus by mere solicitation of Illinois absent consideration 
of what the states given in return, whereas Miller Bros. would likely fail to qualify—furthering the 
distinction between them and making less sense that the Court applied the comparison here). 
203. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 762 (“[A]bsent the solicitation of Bellas Hess, [residents] 
might buy locally and pay the sales tax to support their State.”); see also J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. at 
444 (explaining that it would be practical to view the “benefits which [a state] has conferred by the 
fact of being an orderly, civilized society” could be enough for a state to ask for tax in return). 
204. To tweak Justice Kennedy’s example, consider the following: two businesses sell furniture 
by catalog, one stocks items in a small warehouse in North Sioux City, South Dakota, and the other 
uses a more sophisticated catalog with more options and a major warehouse just over the state line 
in South Sioux City, Nebraska. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (detailing Justice Kennedy’s similar 
example which applies modern technology). “By reason of its physical presence, the first business 
must collect and remit a tax on all sales to customers from South Dakota, even those sales that have 
nothing to do with the warehouse.” Id. This example demonstrates that the physical presence of 
retailers in-state are actually placed at a disadvantage to mail-order houses. Id.; see also Shores, 
supra note 200, at 718 (“This advantage should not be lightly dismissed in an area of law which is 
widely recognized as intellectually impoverished.”); Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 763 (explaining that 
in cases where remote sellers systematically exploit a local market “the difference between the 
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the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause in the first place and fails 
to allow for non-cumbersome state legislation where Congress is 
silent.205 
Adopting the physical presence rule makes even less sense, under past 
or present technological and organizational constraints, when viewed 
against a backdrop set for practical interpretation.206 The only outcome 
of the rule that the Court ventured to address was the cost of compliance 
for sellers, and it did not even attempt to resolve this supposed burden.207 
Even formalistic jurisprudence comprehends that interstate commerce is 
not immune from its fair share of the costs of local government,208 and 
Bellas Hess’s failure to explore mitigating factors or the consequences of 
its decision to states was a disservice to Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.209 While it is not the Court’s job to create legislation 
 
nature of the business conducted by the mail order house and by the local enterprise is not entitled 
to constitutional significance”). 
205. See supra notes 34−47 and accompanying text (detailing the origins of the dormant 
Commerce Clause in Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
206. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (detailing the arbitrary effect the rule has in 
practice); see also Cushman, supra note 3, at 1142 (citing to Houston, E. and W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. 
United States (Shreveport), 234 U.S. 342 (1914)) (describing one of the Court’s most famous 
formal interpretations of the Commerce Clause as housing a rule that was as easy to understand as 
“trying to nail jelly to a wall”). 
207. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759–60 (discussing the “welter of complicated obligations to 
local jurisdictions” that might arise to businesses operating in interstate commerce without the 
physical presence rule). But see id. at 766 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“It is hardly worth remarking that 
appellant’s expressions of consternation and alarm at the burden which the mechanics of 
compliance with use tax obligations would place upon it and others similarly situated should not 
give us pause.”); see also Shores, supra note 200, at 689 (quoting Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 766 
(Fortas, J., dissenting)) (stating that Bellas Hess underestimates the capabilities of “man and his 
machines”). 
208. See Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 461–62 (1959) (“[I]t is 
axiomatic that the founder did not intend to immunize [interstate] commerce from carrying its fair 
share of the costs of the state government in return for the benefits it derives from within the 
State.”); see also W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938) (“It was not the 
purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just 
share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing business.”). 
209. Note the general lack of interest in the majority’s opinion to explore mitigating factors. See 
generally Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. 753 (majority opinion); see also Shores, supra note 200, at 688 
(explaining that Bellas Hess was “less explicit” in its holding). Similarly, note the one-sided tone 
of the opinion, ignoring the effect of the opinion on states. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 763 (Fortas, 
J., dissenting) (detailing that the advantage is only tolerable with “occasional, minor and sporadic” 
sales into a foreign jurisdiction to protect those incidental actors of interstate commerce, whereas 
the advantage “certainly should not be extended where the out-of-state company is engaged in 
exploiting the local market on a regular, systematic, large-scale basis”); see also Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 329 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing 
the physical presence rule as perpetuating an unjust “tax shelter”); Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 
(explaining that the physical presence rule incentivizes businesses to avoid physically engaging 
with States which means “that the market may . . . lack storefronts, distribution points, and 
employment centers that otherwise would be efficient or desirable”); id. at 2092 (holding that the 
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which will pass constitutional muster for states, expecting them to 
conceive of legislation which adequately addresses Commerce Clause 
concerns is not far-fetched.210 The safe harbor provisions in the Act that 
Wayfair endorsed secure the concerns that Bellas Hess actually 
addressed, while also considering States’ rights to collect an otherwise 
lawful tax.211 Modern technology has no bearing on these provisions, and 
both Commerce and Due Process Clause nexuses could have easily been 
satisfied without physical presence in Bellas Hess.212 
B.  Quill Corp. v. North Dakota 
Then, in Quill, the Court somehow managed to both reject and accept 
rigid formalism in dormant Commerce Clause interpretation for the sake 
of stare decisis.213 In doing so it turned a blind eye to the meaningful 
origins of the Complete Auto substantial nexus requirement, which would 
have shown the common thread between the Due Process and Commerce 
Clauses, and justified a sound rejection of the rule under the Commerce 
Clause.214 The Court argued that it established predictability in 
 
physical presence rule is “the sort of arbitrary, formalistic distinction that the Court’s modern 
Commerce Clause precedents disavow”).  
210. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 764 (hypothesizing that the immunity to taxation the Court 
offered remote sellers “may well increase in size and importance”); see also Complete Auto Transit, 
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (citing to Western Live Stock in recognition that practical 
trends in law required the formulation of a new rule to test the validity of State legislation in 
interstate commerce). 
211. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (“[T]he Act applies a safe harbor to those who transact 
only limited business in South Dakota.”); see also Bellas Hess, 386 at 765–66 (“[I]t seems to me 
entirely clear that a mail order house engaged in the business of regularly, systematically, and on a 
large scale offering merchandise for sale in a State in competition with local retailers . . . is not 
excused from compliance with the State’s use tax obligations . . . .”). 
212. South Dakota’s standard was not expressly endorsed as the absolute limit for establishing 
nexus, but it established a jumping-off point for states. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (detailing 
the thresholds of the Act and holding that “nexus is clearly sufficient”). This threshold is easily 
satisfied here given the $2 million that Bellas Hess earned in Illinois. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
10-64-2 (defining the standard in South Dakota to establish nexus by a remote seller as engaging 
in 200 or more transactions, or any number of transactions worth more than $100,000 in a given 
year). 
213. See generally Quill, 504 U.S. 298 (acknowledging that trends in formalism and modern 
considerations might lead the Court to a different result, but remaining hesitant to overturn the 
arbitrary rule for reliance interests’ sake); see also Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 
EMORY L.J. 1459, 1489–90 (2013) (“Quill provides a useful illustration of the concept of specific 
reliance on precedent . . . . I have argued that it is not entirely clear why specific reliance should be 
worthy of judicial solicitude.”). 
214. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 326 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The cases 
from which the Complete Auto Court derived the nexus requirement in its four-part test convince 
me that the issue of ‘nexus’ is really a due process fairness inquiry.”); see also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2093 (citing to Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756) (finding the nexus requirement in Complete Auto 
closely related to the due process requirement, and rejecting the physical presence rule as an 
unnecessary interpretation of nexus). 
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interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause,215 though in practical 
terms it only created a tax shelter for corporations to evade lawful 
taxation.216 In comparison to Bellas Hess, it is astounding that the Court 
arrived at this conclusion when considering the jurisprudence that so 
strongly favored a rejection of the physical presence rule.217 
To start, the Court’s analysis and application of practical treatment of 
dormant Commerce Clause interpretation was cursory at best.218 
Although it detailed an accurate history of the Court’s interpretations, it 
underemphasized the pragmatic concerns presented by Complete Auto by 
virtue of its ultimate conclusion to uphold the physical presence rule.219 
When considering the Court’s reliance on case law leaning towards 
practical readings, it is especially jarring that it chose to uphold a rule that 
it accepted as formalistic in the body of the very same opinion.220 In 
attempting to make an exception for holding on to the physical presence 
rule in the face of practical trends of interpretation, the Court 
distinguished its previous rejection of formal rules as different kinds of 
 
215. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 317 (majority opinion) (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 437 U.S. 160, 
190–91 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (asserting that stare decisis interests in stability compels 
the Court to affirm the physical presence rule). 
216. See id. at 329 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the rule 
perpetuates an “interstate tax shelter for one form of business”); see also SALES TAXES REPORT, 
supra note 12, at 23 (explaining that Quill has kept businesses from complying with states’ sales 
tax legislation). 
217. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309–11 (detailing the Court’s historical encounters with dormant 
Commerce Clause interpretations); see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 
279 (1977) (“Over the years, the Court has applied this practical analysis in approving many types 
of tax . . . .”). 
218. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 314 (agreeing with the lower court’s assessment that trends in 
Commerce Clause interpretation favor the application of flexible rules, but still affirmed a 
formalistic bright-line rule). 
219. The Court had been making efforts towards rejecting formal rules but failed to extend the 
rejection here. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Tex., 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980); see, e.g., 
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978). 
While the freedom of the States to formulate independent policy in this area may have 
to yield to an overriding national interest in uniformity, the content of any uniform rules 
to which they must subscribe should be determined only after due consideration is given 
to the interests of all affected States. 
Id. See also Dep’t of Revenue of Wash. v. Assoc. of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750 
(1978) (explaining that the rejection of direct and indirect definitions of burdens on taxation 
demonstrates a requirement for practical application). 
220. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 317 (“[O]ur reasoning in those cases does not compel that we now 
reject the rule that Bellas Hess established in the area of sales and use taxes.”). But see South Dakota 
v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2094 (quoting W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 
201 (1994) (“The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence has ‘eschewed formalism for a 
sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and effects.’”); Quill Brief for Respondent, supra note 
96, at 10 (“This Court rejected that formalistic free trade interpretation of the commerce clause in 
1977.”). 
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formalism overruled for independent reasons.221 However, this analysis 
undermined itself by drawing an arbitrary distinction to maintain a formal 
rule without focusing on the practical effect the legislation would have.222 
Specifically, the practical effect of the physical presence rule was 
exploitation by remote sellers at the states’ expense.223 Remote seller 
practices have shown that businesses were fully aware of this tax shelter 
and exploited it to the detriment of states and local businesses.224 In these 
situations, Courts were forced to uphold shady business practices that 
were only adopted to assist in meaningfully penetrating foreign markets 
without the collection of sales taxes.225 For example, in Bloomingdale’s 
By Mail v. Commonwealth, Bloomingdale’s set up a separate entity called 
Bloomingdale’s By Mail (By Mail) for the express purpose of avoiding 
tax collection on out-of-state sales.226 The State argued that By Mail was 
practically acting as an agent for Bloomingdale’s, demonstrated when By 
Mail products were accepted as returns to Bloomingdale’s on a few 
 
221. Compare Quill, 504 U.S. at 310 (“[W]e renounced the Freeman approach as ‘attaching 
constitutional significance to a semantic difference.’”), and id. (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted) (“Spector, as we observed in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, created a situation 
in which ‘magic words or labels’ could ‘disable an otherwise constitutional levy.’ Complete Auto 
emphasized the importance of looking past ‘the formal language of the tax statute [to] its practical 
effect’ . . . .”), with id. at 315 (explaining the rule as “artificial at its edges”), and id. at 317 (“[I]n 
our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning other types of taxes we have not adopted a 
similar bright-line [rule] . . . .”). 
222. See Quill Brief for Respondent, supra note 96, at 9 (noting the amount states lost from an 
inability to collect sales taxes from remote sellers in 1991 alone reached $3.08 billion, with an 
estimate of $3.27 billion in 1992) (citing ACIR ESTIMATES OF REVENUE POTENTIAL, supra note 
98, at 2). 
223. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623–24 (1981) (quoting Ford 
Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331. 334–35 (1939)) (detailing that exploitation by foreign 
corporations of local governments through interstate commerce “offers a basis for taxation”); see 
also infra notes 225–28 (discussing Bloomingdale’s By Mail v. Commonwealth, 567 A.2d 773 (Pa. 
1989) and other examples). 
224. See Trelease, supra note 12, at 22 (discussing businesses which have taken blatant 
advantage of the physical presence rule by structuring the businesses’ growth strategy explicitly to 
take advantage of foreign markets while avoiding tax collection requirements); see also Wayfair, 
138 S. Ct. at 2096 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 55, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 
(2018) (No. 17-494) [hereinafter Wayfair Brief for Petitioner]) (detailing Wayfair’s practice of 
advertising lower sales prices because of its ability to avoid sales and use tax collection). 
225. See, e.g., Bloomingdale’s By Mail, 567 A.2d at 778 (granting the business’s motion for 
summary judgment against the State); SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Tracy, 652 N.E.2d 693, 697 
(Ohio 1995) (finding the State’s tax on SFA Folio Collections based on Saks Fifth Avenue’s retail 
stores exhibited insufficient nexus, even when the two companies conducted joint-venture 
advertising campaigns). 
226. Bloomingdale’s By Mail, 567 A.2d at 775–76; see also Trelease, supra note 12, at 22 
(explaining that this was a “conscious plan of co-promotion”). 
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occasions.227 The Court accepted the businesses’ position.228 This 
allowed for Bloomingdale’s brand to penetrate other markets, at the 
expense of local retailers and distributors, without collecting its fair share 
of local taxes for the privilege of exploiting these markets—essentially 
creating a tax shelter for the brand.229 
The only predictable outcome to the physical presence rule was that 
larger corporations would be able to exploit it—yet the Court did not 
address this argument.230 Instead, the Court defended its position by 
arguing that the rule protected small businesses engaged in interstate 
commerce.231 As Wayfair establishes, this position is flawed because, 
even accepting that to be true, it is not a necessary interpretation.232 Even 
still it is not true, because the physical presence rule allows for remote 
businesses to take advantage of state taxes putting them on a level playing 
field with small businesses.233 Wayfair’s rejection of the physical 
 
227. Bloomingdale’s By Mail, 567 A.2d at 776. The seemingly arbitrary returns of products 
from By Mail to Bloomingdale’s retailers were defined as “aberrations” from By Mail’s business 
as usual. Id. at 778. It would seem arbitrary to subject them to tax based on only two returns contrary 
to the rest of its business practice—so why does meaningless, or even accidental, physical presence 
in a State qualify businesses for taxation when meaningful exploitation of foreign markets by 
remote sellers does not? See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556 
(1977) (confirming that physical presence entirely unrelated to the sale of goods into a jurisdiction 
will satisfy the rule). 
228. Bloomingdale’s By Mail, 567 A.2d at 778–79; see id. at 777 (citing to Nat’l Bellas Hess, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967)) (determining that mail or common carrier as 
nexus is insufficient). 
229. See Trelease, supra note 12, at 22 (“Historically, state courts have respected the separate 
existence of retail and catalog merchandising units.”); see also Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax 
Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 338 (1944) (finding that sufficient nexus between a state and the property 
the state seeks to tax when physical presence is satisfied). 
230. This is proven by the need itself to protect smaller businesses, but the physical presence 
rule’s reach is far too broad. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018) 
(detailing safe harbor provisions); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 329 (1992) 
(White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “unfairness of [the physical presence rule] on retailers other 
than direct marketers should be taken into account”). 
231. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (“Bellas Hess . . . created a safe harbor for vendors ‘whose only 
connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by common carrier or the United States mail’”). 
But this argument overlooks the fact that small businesses could still stumble upon nexus by, for 
example, hiring an in-state contractor to install a machine it sold over state lines. See also Quill 
Brief for Respondent, supra note 96, at 27–28 (further explaining that a multi-state business could 
avoid that very same nexus even if it were to sell $1 million worth of goods into that state). 
232. In the same example offered supra note 231 and accompanying text, the multi-state 
business would avoid taxation where local business would not, in direct contradiction of the 
practical initiative undertaken by Complete Auto. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 
U.S. 274, 281 (1977) (“[T]he Court consistently has indicated that ‘interstate commerce may be 
made to pay its way,’ and has moved toward a standard of permissibility of state taxation based 
upon its actual effect rather than its legal terminology.”). 
233. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 329 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Brief 
for State of New Jersey as Amicus Curiae at 4, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) 
(No. 91-194) [hereinafter Quill New Jersey Amicus Curiae]) (“I would think that protectionist rules 
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presence rule is far more workable, and far more beneficial to small 
businesses, as it provides them safe harbor through the passages of 
interstate commerce because they would likely fall short of meaningfully 
engaging in interstate commerce.234 
The Court, albeit in good faith, carved out an exception to taking a 
practical reading of dormant Commerce Clause issues in favor of a 
historically formal assessment, but did so without considering the effects 
the exception would have on the two most affected parties: states and 
businesses.235 In the competitive marketplaces of interstate and local 
commerce, one should expect businesses to take every avenue they can 
to raise profits.236 However, cost cutting under the physical presence rule 
tipped the scales far in favor of businesses, leaving state marketplaces 
available without state inclusion.237 
C.  South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. 
The Wayfair Court found physical presence unnecessary in 
establishing a substantial nexus between the transaction and the taxing 
state.238 It found the physical presence rule to be unworkable in the 
 
favoring a $180-billion-a-year industry might come within the scope of such ‘structural 
concerns.’”). 
234. What Quill fails to address is that the arbitrary nature of its own rule fails to have the effect 
of invoking an “established bright-line” as the Court had hoped. See supra note 221 and 
accompanying text. A better assignment of a “bright-line” that actually considers economic effect 
and allows a degree of control for those who participate in interstate commerce could be gleaned 
from a de minimis standard. See Quill Brief for Respondent, supra note 96, at 28 n.5 (explaining 
that North Dakota invokes such a de minimis standard which allows Quill and others to understand 
what threshold limitations on taxation are) (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 81-04.1-01-03.1(3) 
(2019)); see also Paul J. Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-State Mail-Order Sales, 39 
VAND. L. REV. 993, 1016 (1986) (“There are a number of possible approaches that Congress could 
use to reduce compliance costs: (1) a de minimis rule (exempt firms with sales below a certain 
threshold dollar amount) . . . .”). 
235. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 329 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relenting 
that the rule does not put businesses on even playing fields and fails to consider the realities of the 
massive mail-order industry); see also ACIR ESTIMATES OF REVENUE POTENTIAL, supra note 98, 
at 2 (qualifying the initial estimate that mail-order sales in 1990 comprised 25 percent of all retail 
sales was a conservative estimate); Hartman, supra note 234, at 1007–08 (underestimating the 
actual percentage by at least 5 percent). 
236. See, e.g., Bloomingdale’s By Mail v. Commonwealth, 567 A.2d 773 (Pa. 1989) (creating 
co-promoting businesses to maximize brand recognition and profit to each); SFA Folio Collections, 
Inc. v. Tracy, 652 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio 1995) (detailing same); see also South Dakota v. Wayfair, 
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018) (citing Wayfair Brief for Petitioner, supra note 224, at 55) 
(detailing Wayfair’s advertisements promoting lower sales prices than local competitors by virtue 
of sales tax exemption). 
237. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096 (citing Wayfair Brief for Petitioner, supra note 224, at 55) 
(explaining that Wayfair’s advertising technique fails to consider the negative implications that it 
has upon the State by belittling its local storefronts and economic activity without even collecting 
sales taxes the State is already owed). 
238. See id. at 2092 (explaining and showing that the physical presence rule is not a “necessary 
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economy, both past and present.239 The Court also determined that 
modern realities highlighted the pitfalls of applying such a formalistic 
rule to Commerce Clause concerns.240 
The Court found that Quill made an unnecessary distinction between 
the Complete Auto test’s substantial-nexus requirement and the Due 
Process Clause’s similar requirement for minimum contacts.241 There is 
even evidence to suggest that the substantial nexus requirement is 
actually founded in the Due Process Clause’s requirement for minimum 
contacts, essentially giving the taxpayer notice that they are subject to the 
state’s jurisdiction.242 
The Court also correctly explained that the objective of the dormant 
Commerce Clause is only to remove burdens upon, or discrimination 
against, interstate commerce.243 The physical presence rule, however, 
extended this definition into unconstitutional territory by offering 
interstate commerce a meaningful competitive advantage over local 
markets.244 Rather than having a rule, admitted to be incorrectly 
 
interpretation” to achieve substantial nexus with a taxing state); see also, Quill, 504 U.S. at 328 
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“But in today’s economy, physical presence 
frequently has very little to do with a transaction a State might seek to tax.”). 
239. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (“Quill creates rather than resolves market distortions.”); 
see also Wayfair Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 2–3 (“Quill’s erroneous bright-line rule is 
concededly depriving the States of tens of billions in revenue because it shelters not only 
hypothetically burdened small sellers, but real, billion-dollar retailers like respondents, even in 
States imposing no burdens at all.”). 
240. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (citing Hellerstein, supra note 120, at 553) (explaining the 
necessity of nexus, but only under modern application of jurisprudence). 
241. See supra notes 104–07 (detailing the Court’s analysis of this errant distinction); see also 
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (“The reasons given in Quill for rejecting the physical presence rule for 
due process purposes apply as well to the question whether physical presence is a requisite for an 
out-of-state seller’s liability to remit sales taxes. Physical presence is not necessary to create a 
substantial nexus.”); see also Quill Brief for Respondent, supra note 96, at 26 (citing Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Comm’r of Tex., 445 U.S. 425, 437 (1980)) (alterations in original) (explaining that the 
Court had already articulated a standard very similar to Wayfair’s standard, wherein “taxing 
authority exists when the marketer has purposefully ‘avail[ed] itself of the substantial privilege of 
carrying on business within the State’”). 
242. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (quoting Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of 
Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967)) (explaining that the nexus requirement is “closely related” to the 
minimum contacts requirement); see also id. (“The reasons given in Quill for rejecting the physical 
presence rule for due process purposes apply as well to the question whether physical presence is 
a requisite for an out-of-state seller’s liability to remit sales taxes. Physical presence is not necessary 
to create a substantial nexus.”); see also Section III.B, supra notes 222–29 and accompanying text 
(explaining that the rule swallows itself). 
243. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 
274, 279 (1977)) (detailing the Complete Auto test and the Court’s limitations on regulation). 
244. See id. (citing D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988)) (“After all, 
‘interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes.’”); see also Wayfair Reply 
Brief, supra note 146, at 11–12 (demonstrating the physical presence rule’s dramatic overbreadth 
in testing regulation upon interstate commerce). 
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formulated,245 the Court took the suggestions of commentators and 
endorsed de minimis thresholds.246 Though not setting the threshold 
itself, the Court allowed South Dakota’s transaction and cost minimums 
to provide some clarity in what the standard might be moving forward.247 
As precedent admits, the rule existed for only the supposed benefit of 
having a rule.248 However, the forced acceptance of arbitrary results by 
courts and legislatures was the unintended effect of such a bright-line 
rule.249 For example, a business could sell one single product into a state 
they have physical presence in and be subject to taxation because that 
presence, though unrelated to the transaction in question, is itself 
sufficient.250 The Quill and Bellas Hess Courts were so preoccupied with 
concerns that small businesses might be disadvantaged that they failed to 
address the concern low-population states face with an already limited 
tax base.251 The result sheltered businesses from state enforcement of 
 
245. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“I agree that Bellas Hess was 
wrongly decided.”); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (stating that 
modern jurisprudence “might not dictate the same result” were Bellas Hess to arise for the first time 
in 1992). 
246. States have attempted to draft standards to combat the burden that collection might place 
upon interstate commerce since before Quill—for examples, see the following: TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 67-6-702(f) (West 1989); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-221 (1989); FLA. STAT. § 212.0596(g) 
(West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.21(4)(c) (West 1991); MO. ANN. STAT. § 144.605(14)(a) 
(West 1991); N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(8)(iv) (McKinney 1991). Many observers have disagreed with 
the rule’s tenure as well. See Hartman, supra note 234, at 1007 (“[R]eview and reversal of that 
decision seem proper.”); see also Kozel, supra note 213, at 1490 (understanding that the Court 
applied the theory of specific reliance to the decision, but concluding that specific reliance is an 
unsupported judicial doctrine). 
247. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (holding that nexus was “clearly sufficient” and accounted 
for burdens of compliance); see also JOSEPH BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., TAX FOUNDATION 
FISCAL FACT NO. 609: POST-WAYFAIR OPTIONS FOR STATES 6 (Rachel Shuster ed., 2018) (showing 
the Wayfair safe harbor standard as the closest to a workable threshold the Supreme Court allows 
with certainty). 
248. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (“This artificiality, however, is more than offset by the benefits 
of a clear rule.”). But see Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (explaining that the rule’s artificiality is its 
downfall because it creates artificial competitive advantages). 
249. As Justice Kennedy explained, a business with one salesman in each state could sell only 
one product into any state and face sales tax collection duties; while another business with five 
hundred salesmen in one state and sell one million products to each of the other forty-nine states 
and still avoid tax collection. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (detailing a similar example); see also 
SALES TAXES REPORT, supra note 12, at 13 (finding that in a study of over four hundred internet 
retailers, 31 percent of those retailers exist in only two states). 
250. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556 (1977); see Wayfair 
Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 5 (detailing that a “single in-state employee, traveling salesmen, or 
three-day annual trip suffice for nexus under Quill”). 
251. See generally Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967); 
Quill, 504 U.S. 298; see also SALES TAXES REPORT, supra note 12, at 13 (detailing the decreased 
likelihood that internet sellers would have a physical presence in small states, contrasting it with 
the rise of internet sales to show that smaller states are less likely able to collect taxes on all sales 
into their states).  
664 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  51 
sales tax collection on substantial and meaningful sales through interstate 
commerce.252 Rather than allowing formalism to build any further, the 
Court correctly chose to embrace practical considerations, address these 
concerns, and do away with an unworkable rule.253 
In overturning this precedent, the Court addressed a host of the 
Respondents’ concerns and demonstrated a workable outcome founded 
in sound legal interpretation.254 The most cited arguments in support of 
the physical presence rule were the so-called cost of compliance and the 
multitude of jurisdictions that businesses would be subjected to in 
collecting sales taxes.255 These concerns are hard to seriously consider 
when several businesses had already complied with state tax laws in 
states in where they had no physical presence, regardless of their ability 
to avoid them under the rule.256 As Justice Fortas said fifty years ago, the 
physical presence rule “vastly underestimates the skill of contemporary 
man and his machines.”257 
The safe harbor provision adequately protects businesses from tracking 
insignificant transactions and unsubstantial amounts of business done in 
foreign jurisdictions.258 At the same time, it functions to hold businesses 
 
252. See Wayfair Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 14 (“[T]he physical presence rule increasingly 
functions more like a hidden trap than a well-lit shelter.”). But see SALES TAXES REPORT, supra 
note 12, at 23–24 (explaining that due to the complex nature of state obligations, businesses under 
the physical presence rule were at risk to subject themselves to accidental nexus, qualifying them 
for issuance of back-taxes and likely litigation). 
253. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (citing Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 
(2009)). 
254. See id. (citing Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 11) (embracing the Complete Auto nexus 
requirement’s undoubtedly Due Process Clause background by setting the rule for nexus as satisfied 
when a remote seller “avails” itself of the substantial privilege of doing business in a given state); 
see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 326 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he issue 
of ‘nexus’ is really a due process fairness inquiry.”). 
255. See, e.g., Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759–60; see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6 (majority 
opinion) (praising the rule for preventing businesses from facing six thousand-plus jurisdictions 
which levy sales taxes). 
256. See Wayfair Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 17 (“Experience and common sense confirm 
that most sellers . . . can comply [with state sales tax collection] at reasonable expense and in short 
order.”); see also Avalara, Guide to Sales Tax Collection in Amazon, ch. 3 (2018), 
https://www.avalara.com/trustfile/en/guides/amazon/fulfillment-by-amazon.html [https://perma.cc 
/WY2L-6NY2] (explaining that Amazon agreed to collect sales taxes for all fifty States). 
257. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 766 (Fortas, J., dissenting); see also Shores, supra note 200, at 
689 (emphasizing this argument in Justice Fortas’ “vigorous dissent”); Hartman, supra note 234, 
at 1011–12 (noting that the advent of automated accounting systems, particularly their prevalence 
as early as the 1980s, suggests that the task of tracking sales and tax obligations might be easier 
than precedent suggested). 
258. The provision prevents businesses with menial sales into South Dakota from collection 
requirements, setting a threshold of $100,000 or two hundred transactions. See S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 10-64-2; see also BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 8 (describing these safe 
harbor thresholds as vital to passing constitutional review). 
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accountable for tax collection duties to those jurisdictions with which 
they meaningfully engage.259 This could have been a sufficient offsetting 
principle in the first place to avoid the physical presence rule,260 yet it 
certainly carries weight over Respondents’ concerns now as modern 
technology has made it easier to track and record transactions.261 
Sophisticated software exists to lighten the burden of compliance while 
still allowing States to collect what they are owed.262 Regardless, the 
concern that businesses might face difficulty in complying with proper 
constitutional interpretation is no reason for the Court to create a rule, 
contradictory to Commerce Clause precedent, that favors interstate 
commerce over states’ access to their own tax bases.263 
The Court also addressed concerns that stare decisis might require 
affirmance of the rule.264 Respondents’ argued that the rule was owed 
extra deference under an enhanced form of stare decisis, which was owed 
even more deference based on congressional silence towards the physical 
presence rule.265 They relied on Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, a 
 
259. Under this schema, businesses who rightfully qualify will be made to pay their way for 
exploiting interstate markets. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 274, 281 
(1977). At the same time, the added benefit to states’ tax bases will assist local market growth to 
the benefit of local and remote sellers. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 
328) (explaining that “solvent state and local governments” are essential to “create the climate of 
consumer confidence” required for commerce to thrive in general). 
260. Though not exactly the same, see N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 81-04.1-01-03.1(3) (1987), which 
applied a de minimis (or safe harbor) standard based upon the number of bulk-mailings a remote 
seller sent to the State per year. For other examples of proposed de minimis standards see supra 
note 246, which includes references to several states’ efforts to establish constitutional de minimis 
standards under the physical presence rule. See also Quill Brief for Respondent, supra note 96, at 
44 (detailing efforts of states to “lessen whatever collection burdens do exist”). 
261. See Wayfair Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 19 (explaining that the respondents over-
exaggerated the cost of compliance and would mostly spawn from transitioning software rather 
than implementing it from scratch); see also Timothy H. Gillis, Collecting the Use Tax on Mail-
Order Sales, 79 GEO. L.J. 535, 552 (1991) (detailing the availability of sophisticated computer 
software to track rates and requirements for as low as $7,000). 
262. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099–2100 (detailing the benefits of the Streamlined Sales and 
Use Tax Agreement which immunizes sellers from liability for reliance on computer 
programming); see also Quill Brief for Respondent, supra note 96, at 39–40 (detailing the systems 
of computation that existed even during Quill’s adjudication). 
263. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 766 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (warning that the majority was too 
concerned by the cost of compliance). 
264. See generally Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096–99 (detailing the Court’s assessment of stare 
decisis concerns); see also Kozel, supra note 213, at 1489 (explaining that Quill reaffirmed the 
physical presence rule for the sake of specific reliance). 
265. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 320 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989)) (“We have long recognized that 
the doctrine of stare decisis has ‘special force’ where ‘Congress remains free to alter what we have 
done.’”); see also Wayfair Respondents’ Brief, supra note 92, at 27–28 (citing Michigan v. Bay 
Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014)) (explaining that in such cases, the court needs 
“special justification” for departing from the decision). 
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case that afforded the petitioner a “super-powered stare decisis” that 
would have required a special justification, as well as proof that the 
precedent was unworkable, to overturn.266 Respondents are correct that 
stare decisis does advise the Court to maintain even flawed decisions for 
the sake of precedent,267 but the Court showed that the standards of even 
an enhanced form of stare decisis were not met.268 The Court pointed to 
the State’s eroding tax base and the fact that a more practical and 
workable rule existed in rejecting the physical presence rule’s reliance 
interests.269 
Moreover, this artificial foundation proved increasingly unworkable 
under contemporary considerations.270 For example, Courts might 
struggle with defining physical presence under technological 
considerations related to e-commerce, as evidenced by states efforts to do 
so already.271 The ability to meaningfully connect with consumers via the 
internet through storing information on their computers through 
electronic cookies begs the question how far physical presence actually 
goes.272 This could lead to businesses unknowingly presenting 
 
266. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2410 (2015) (“As against this 
superpowered form of stare decisis, we would need a super special justification to warrant reversing 
Brulotte.”); see also Wayfair Respondents’ Brief, supra note 92, at 59 (quoting Kimble, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2409–10) (“‘[L]ong congressional acquiescence’ further amplifies the effect of stare decisis.”). 
267. Beyond enhanced stare decisis when handling Commerce Clause issues in general, Justice 
Scalia further opined that reliance interests strengthen the doctrine even more. See Quill, 504 U.S. 
at 321 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Having affirmatively suggested that the ‘physical presence’ rule 
could be reconciled with our new jurisprudence, we ought not visit economic hardship upon those 
who took us at our word.”). 
268. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098 (“But even on its own terms, the physical presence rule as 
defined by Quill is no longer a clear or easily applicable standard, so arguments for reliance based 
on its clarity are misplaced.”); see also Wayfair Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 9 (“It is ‘special 
justification’ enough to eliminate a wholly arbitrary constitutional rule.”). 
269. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2097 (citing U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-
COMMERCE SALES: 4TH QUARTER 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS (2018) [hereinafter 4TH 
QUARTER 2017 RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES]) (noting that mail-order sales of $180 billion in 1992 
have more than doubled through e-commerce which recorded estimates of about $453.5 billion); 
see also SALES TAXES REPORT, supra note 12, at 11–12 (detailing that states could be losing out 
on up to $13 billion). 
270. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2097–98 (“States are already confronting the complexities of 
defining physical presence in the Cyber Age.”); see also Wayfair Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 
14–15 (detailing issues that come along with technology growth in defining what is and is not 
sufficient to establish physical presence). 
271. For example, Massachusetts and Ohio proffered legislation that would define physical 
presence of remote sellers if they allowed for their cell-phone apps to be downloadable in the state, 
or attempted to store cookies on users’ computers. See 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 64 H.1.7 (2017); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5741.01(I)(1)–(2) (2018). 
272. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095 (“A website may leave cookies saved to the customers’ 
hard drives, or customers may download the company’s app onto their phones.”); see also Wayfair 
Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 15 (explaining that courts who seek to find a clearer definition of 
physical presence “will have no useful tools to analyze those questions because the bright-line rule 
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themselves to state jurisdiction and subjecting them to tax.273 If 
businesses were unaware of their duty to collect and remit such taxes, 
they would become subject to retroactive liability for however long they 
were in violation, potentially years.274 The Court made sure to commend 
South Dakota’s inclusion of a provision that prevented retroactive 
liability.275 
In closing, the Court mentioned that the Streamlined Sales and Use 
Tax Agreement (SSUTA) is a valuable modern tool to assist in relieving 
the burden of compliance.276 The SSUTA was created as a direct 
response to the language of the court in Bellas Hess and Quill,277 which 
stated that subjecting retailers to so many jurisdictions for purposes of 
taxation was too great a burden under the Commerce Clause.278 Currently 
 
is admittedly disconnected from underlying constitutional principles”). 
273. See Wayfair Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 14–15 (detailing several situations such as 
independent contractors hired by companies, or cookies used in company software, maintaining a 
physical presence in a state unknown to the business subjecting it to retroactive tax liability); see 
also Brief for Colorado et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18, South Dakota v. Wayfair, 
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494) [hereinafter Wayfair Colorado et al. Amici Curiae] (“By 
any reasonable measure, the traditional physical–presence rule—first announced in 1967, two years 
before the moon landing—has proved unworkable in today’s interconnected market.”). 
274. See, e.g., Wayfair Reply Brief, supra note 146, at 14 (“Under Quill’s odd rule, that 
unintentional, minor, and arbitrary physical presence suffices.”); see also SALES TAXES REPORT, 
supra note 12, at 24 (noting a lawyer who worked in seven cases in which an assessment for 
retroactive tax liability was made due to a seller’s unknown presence in a state through some 
unrelated extension). 
275. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-5 (2019)) (defining 
the bar to retroactive liability as a design which will “prevent discrimination against or undue 
burdens upon interstate commerce”). 
276. See id. at 2100 (“[The SSUTA] standardizes taxes to reduce administrative and compliance 
costs: It requires a single, state level tax administration, uniform definitions of products and 
services, simplified tax rate structures, and other uniform rules.”); see generally STREAMLINED 
SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT (May 10, 
2018) [hereinafter SSUTA], https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/docs/default-source/agreement/ 
ssuta/ssuta-as-amended-2018-12-14.pdf?sfvrsn=8a83c020_6 [https://perma.cc/RL6Q-2QX6]. 
277. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1967) 
(emphasis added) (“The many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in 
administrative and record-keeping requirements could entangle [Bellas Hess’s] interstate business 
in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to 
impose ‘a fair share of the cost of the local government.’”); see also Brief for Amicus Curiae 
Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board, Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 6, South Dakota v. 
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494) [hereinafter Wayfair Streamlined Amicus Curiae] 
(quoting Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759 n.14) (“[I]f just the localities which now impose the tax were 
to realize anything like their potential of out-of-State registrants the recordkeeping task of 
multistate sellers would be clearly intolerable.”); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 
(“Such a rule firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to 
collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those taxes.”). 
278. See Wayfair Streamlined Amicus Curiae, supra note 277, at 7 (explaining that the SSUTA 
was created based on a recognition of the Court’s concerns with “variations in sales tax rates, 
allowable exemptions, and recordkeeping requirements in States and local jurisdictions”); see also 
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more than half of all states which authorize the collection of sales and use 
taxes on transactions are full members of the SSUTA (“Streamlined 
States”), as well as thousands of retailers.279 One such way the SSUTA 
lessens state burdens is through uniformity, enforcing Streamlined States 
to provide a single state sales tax rate across all internal jurisdictions for 
remote sellers.280 This provision speaks to the heart of Bellas Hess’s and 
Quill’s concern for subjecting remote sellers to a “welter of complicated 
obligations.”281 
Relieving burdens aside, the SSUTA goes above and beyond to 
provide access and information about sales tax requirements to remote 
sellers engaging in a given Streamlined State.282 One such way the 
SSUTA offers assistance is through the assignment of Certified Service 
Providers (CSPs).283 The job of a CSP is to connect the taxing state to the 
remote seller who engages with them by implementing software, keeping 
records of sales and tax information, and providing general information 
on the taxation requirements of given States or jurisdictions to the remote 
seller.284 The CSP will even file the required tax returns, remit the sales 
taxes collected, and handle deficiencies and audits on behalf of the remote 
seller between the seller and the taxing state.285 Aside from the benefits 
of convenience in having a CSP establish the framework for taxation, the 
remote seller’s reliance on a CSP insulates the seller from liability for 
error in either the CSP’s efforts or the software which calculates taxation 
 
State Information, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC. [hereinafter Streamlined State 
Information], https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/Shared-Pages/State-Detail [https://perma.cc/ 
G8RP-6ZH7] (detailing same). 
279. Wayfair Streamlined Amicus Curiae, supra note 277, at 1–2; see also State Information, 
STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, INC., 
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/Shared-Pages/State-Detail [https://perma.cc/G8RP-6ZH7] 
(listing all twenty-three member states as well as the twenty-fourth associate member, Tennessee). 
280. SSUTA, supra note 276, at § 308; see also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2100 (detailing the 
uniform rate of tax as a feature which reduces “administrative and compliance costs”). 
281. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759–60; Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6. 
282. See SSUTA, supra note 276, at § 203 (“An agent certified under the Agreement to perform 
all the seller’s sales and use tax functions . . . other than the seller’s obligation to remit tax on its 
own purchases.”); see generally Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (“SSUTA”), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1381 (2007) 
(analyzing the effect the SSUTA has by virtue of its collaboration through the States). 
283. See SSUTA, supra 276, at § 203 (detailing the definition of a CSP); see also Wayfair 
Streamlined Amicus Curiae, supra note 277, at 1412 (explaining that the SSUTA offers certified 
service providers at no extra charge to remote sellers). 
284. See Wayfair Streamlined Amicus Curiae, supra note 277, at 1412–13 (explaining that the 
SSUTA offers CSPs at no extra charge to remote sellers); see also Streamlined State Information, 
supra note 278 (describing the scope of CSPs). 
285. See Wayfair Streamlined Amicus Curiae, supra note 277, at 8 (explaining that the central 
authority of the SSUTA “is responsible for distributing any applicable local taxes to the appropriate 
jurisdictions”); see also SSUTA, supra note 276, at § 301 (detailing same). 
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and keeps records.286 With so many safeguards attached, remote sellers 
would have no concerns about unknown or retroactive liability.287 
The most telling aspect of the SSUTA, however, is that modern 
technology has no bearing on its existence. True, it employs modern 
software to track transactions and ensure that businesses abide by the 
laws of various jurisdictions,288 but the very idea that a central-
organization could catalog and collect sales taxes does not require 
technological sophistication. This feat could still have been accomplished 
if businesses cooperated with state representatives to understand what 
was owed to whom after consummating a transaction; essentially what 
the SSUTA does now.289 As for small businesses that transacted 
insignificant sales in a specific jurisdiction, de minimis thresholds could 
have saved them from collecting taxes on smaller sales that were few and 
far between. There was never any reason to overcorrect the issue at hand 
in Bellas Hess—creating a rule meant to protect businesses from tax 
duties in jurisdictions they rarely interacted with—when the real issue 
was how to impose such duties on a business that meaningfully exploited 
a certain jurisdiction.290 
IV.  WHERE TO GO 
A.  State Responses 
The practical effect of the abolition of the physical presence rule most 
clearly manifests itself in states’ responses to the holding.291 Despite 
 
286. See SSUTA, supra note 276, at § 306 (detailing relief from liability including reliance 
upon the CSP or software which the seller engages with). The SSUTA clearly focuses on engaging 
sellers by lessening the costs of compliance and making taxation as simple and accessible as 
possible. Id. at §102. Further enticing is the fact that in the event of such a calculation error which 
leads to a state seeking action, there is a rebuttable presumption assumed under the SSUTA that the 
CSP and remote seller exercised due diligence in attempting to remit the sales tax. Id. at § 305(F)–
(H). 
287. See Wayfair Streamlined Amicus Curiae, supra note 277, at 9–10 (“Thus, the Member 
States, and their local partners, have made every effort to relieve a retailer’s burden in this area.”). 
288. See id. at 9 (detailing that responsibility for collecting and remitting the taxes will transfer 
to the SSUTA rather than to the individual businesses). 
289. Id. 
290. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 762−63 (Fortas, J., 
dissenting) (noting that Bellas Hess engaged in a regular and systematic exploitation of Illinois’s 
consumer market, and arguing the Court should have considered this point more seriously). 
291. See BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 3 (explaining states considering the 
next appropriate steps towards passing legislation in conformity with Wayfair while keeping 
interstate commerce burdens in mind); see also EY, INDIRECT TAX ALERT: STATES RESPOND TO 
THE US SUPREME COURT RULING IN SOUTH DAKOTA V. WAYFAIR 1–4 (2018) [hereinafter EY 
INDIRECT TAX ALERT] (detailing the immediate announcements and various legislative actions of 
states in the month following the Wayfair decision). 
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Respondents’ concerns,292 many states have followed South Dakota’s 
lead and taken reasonable steps to clarify economic nexus,293 shield small 
businesses, and ensure predictable and logical compliance under the 
Court’s ruling.294 It is no coincidence that SSUTA member states are on 
the front foot in attaining compliance with Wayfair.295 
Since Wayfair, contrary to Respondents’ beliefs, the SSUTA has 
offered several workable alternatives in which many Streamlined States 
engage.296 Some states even passed legislation that updated nexus post-
physical presence rule that took effect as early as October 2018, while 
many others opted for the beginning of 2019 and beyond.297 To explain, 
SSUTA membership is not in and of itself an embodiment of all dormant 
Commerce Clause concerns voiced by the Wayfair Court—it is only a 
tool by which states and remote sellers can clarify nexus and lessen 
 
292. See Wayfair Respondents’ Brief, supra note 92, at 55 (warning that states cannot “be left 
to set the limits on their own authority” under the dormant Commerce Clause for fear of placing 
undue burdens on interstate commerce); id. (explaining that the physical presence rule prevents 
“perverse economic and regulatory incentives[,]” which leads states away from sensible law-
making). 
293. S.B. 106, supra note 16 (detailing thresholds to establish economic nexus on a remote 
seller for purpose of sales taxation at $200,000 or two hundred separate sales transactions). 
294. See H.B. 61, 365th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2018) (sec. 2 C.2(1)(A)) (detailing limits 
of $250,000 or two hundred individual transactions to secure economic nexus); see also SF 2417, 
87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018) (detailing limits of $200,000 or at least two hundred 
separate sales transactions to secure economic nexus); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.340 (2019) 
(detailing limits of $100,000 or at least two hundred separate sales transactions); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ A4261 (2018) (detailing limits of $100,000 or at least two hundred separate sales transactions); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-39.2-02.2 (2019) (detailing limits of $100,000 in the previous calendar 
year); S.B. 2001, 2018 Leg. 2nd Special Sess. (Utah 2018) (detailing limits of $100,000 in sales or 
at least two hundred separate sales transactions to secure economic nexus); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 32 
§ 9701(9)(F)(3)(iii), (9)(J) (2018) (detailing limits of $100,000 in sales or at least two hundred 
separate sales transactions to secure economic nexus); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 39-15-501 (2018) 
(detailing limits of $100,000 in sales or at least two hundred separate transactions to secure 
economic nexus). 
295. See BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 8 (explaining that mere codification to 
the SSUTA establishes compliance with most requirements mentioned in the Wayfair decision); 
see generally Matthew Rocco, Online Sales Taxes Take Effect in These States, FOXBUSINESS: 
TAXES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.foxbusiness.com/retail/online-sales-taxes-take-effect-in-these-
states [https://perma.cc/HL9T-7JAQ]. 
296. See BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 8–16 (detailing the number of states 
which have actively engaged in passing or drafting legislation which work towards creating a sales 
tax standard which will comply with Wayfair ruling); see also Ryan Prete, After ‘Wayfair,’ Which 
States Are Ready to Tax Online Purchases? (1), BLOOMBERG: BNA (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.bna.com/wayfair-states-ready-n73014476940/ [https://perma.cc/7TAD-GLSC] 
(claiming twenty-one states “have an economic nexus model in place like South Dakota’s”). 
297. Requiring compliance with new tax laws within only six months of the Wayfair decision. 
See Rocco, supra note 295 (naming twenty-two different states that plan to begin sales tax 
collection from remote sellers, all of which are either Streamlined States or include provisions 
similar to Streamlined State requirements). 
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burdens on interstate commerce.298 Specifically, two elements that the 
SSUTA does not address, which the Court did, are safe harbor principles 
and retroactive liability upon remote sellers.299 That being said, states that 
have passed conforming legislation have largely addressed these 
principles. Even if a state has not passed sales tax legislation since 
Wayfair, if it is a Streamlined State it will likely satisfy concerns that the 
imposition of the sales tax would be a burden on interstate commerce.300 
Of the twenty-three full-member Streamlined States, twenty-two have 
updated legislation likely to pass constitutional muster, thanks in part to 
SSUTA membership, but also because of full adherence to the principles 
outlined in Wayfair.301 Some of these states even drafted this legislation 
long before the Wayfair decision, anticipating a change in law that would 
allow them to reclaim their tax base.302 For example, Vermont, a 
Streamlined State, effectuated its current sales tax legislation in 2016 
with a provision that allowed for nexus without physical presence, but 
expressly provided that the provision would be without support until 
Congress or the Court rejected the physical presence rule.303 The 
provision, now in effect, sets familiar safe harbor boundaries for small 
 
298. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018) (explaining that South 
Dakota’s Act exhibited positive features lending towards acceptance without formally defining 
what those thresholds were); see also BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 6 (displaying 
a seven-part checklist for sales tax legislation, of which five factors are already met by SSUTA 
compliance and two are still unmet without the appropriate legislative provisions). 
299. For the Court’s discussion of safe harbor principles, see Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 
(detailing that the Act provides “safe harbor to those who only transact limited business” and 
alluding to the concern that legislation that does not provide limitations on business transactions 
prior to sales tax collection will fail the first prong of the Complete Auto test); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 10-64-1. For the Court’s discussion of retroactive liability, see Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 
(addressing the concern raised by Respondents that businesses would be subject to retroactive 
liability in collecting sales taxes under a new substantial nexus threshold); see also Wayfair Tax 
Foundation Amicus Curiae, supra note 165, at 11 (alleging, prior to Wayfair’s decision, that the 
nexus standard in South Dakota is constitutional, citing the retroactive collection as a check on 
burdens upon interstate commerce). 
300. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099; see generally BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247 
(detailing the Court’s holding and how states have interpreted the thresholds for nexus since the 
decision: “The other five items were met through other provisions in state law relating to South 
Dakota’s adherence to SSUTA.”). 
301. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (“First, the Act applies a safe harbor to those who transact 
only limited business in South Dakota. Second, the Act ensures that no obligation to remit the sales 
tax may be applied retroactively.”); see also BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 6 
(detailing the Safe Harbor language used in Wayfair, as well as referencing concerns on retroactive 
collection). 
302. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 9701(9)(F) (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68 § 1392 (2018). 
303. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 9701(9)(F) ((“Text of subdiv. (9)(F) effective until on the 
later of July 1, 2017, or the first day of the quarter after a controlling court decision or federal 
legislation abrogates the physical presence requirement of Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 
(1992).”). 
672 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  51 
businesses, establishing nexus if remote sellers made sales of at least 
$100,000 or two hundred individual transactions during a preceding 
twelve-month period.304 
For states who are not yet party to the SSUTA, compliance with 
Wayfair is still possible,305 it just requires that the state addresses all of 
the concerns posed by the Complete Auto test independently.306 In the 
process of doing away with the physical presence rule, the Court did not 
address whether the South Dakota Act actually met constitutional 
requirements, making the minimum compliance requirements for the rest 
of the Complete Auto test seemingly ambiguous.307 However, ambiguity 
has not stopped non-Streamlined States’ efforts to reclaim their tax 
bases.308 For example, Alabama, though not a member of the SSUTA, 
adopted a revenue threshold of $250,000.309 In place of the CSP 
framework established by the SSUTA, Alabama established the option to 
collect a uniform flat rate of 8 percent of use tax in lieu of multiple taxes 
otherwise imposed by its various jurisdictions.310 Idaho has also adopted 
 
304. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 9701(9)(F). 
A person making sales of tangible personal property from outside this State to a 
destination within this State and not maintaining a place of business or other physical 
presence in this State that . . . has either made sales from outside this State to destinations 
within this State of at least $100,000.00, or totaling at least 200 individual sales 
transactions, during any 12-month period preceding . . . . 
Id. 
305. See BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 13–16 (detailing states’ attempts to 
pass legislation that seem viable based on their adherence to the Court’s cited concerns); see also 
Rocco, supra note 295 (detailing several states not party to the SSUTA that have effectuated sales 
tax legislation implicating remote sellers). 
306. Wayfair only addressed the first prong of the four-pronged Complete Auto test, which 
governs the constitutional limits of taxation upon interstate commerce. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091–
92. But see BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 5–6 (citing Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099–
100) (using the final portion of the Wayfair decision to glean a threshold for nexus requirements). 
307. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (“The question remains whether some other principle in 
the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act. Because the Quill physical 
presence rule was an obvious barrier to the Act’s validity, these issues have not yet been litigated 
or briefed, and so the Court need not resolve them here.”); see also BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., 
supra note 247, at 6 (explaining that the checklist is not a dispositive reading of the Court’s opinion 
in Wayfair, only that it “strongly suggests” that the provisions of the SSUTA would meet 
constitutional limitations). 
308. See BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 13–16 (detailing the number of non-
SSUTA member states and what efforts they have made towards taxation); see also Prete, supra 
note 296 (detailing such initiatives of several states). 
309. Simplified Sellers Use Tax FAQs, ALABAMA DEP’T OF REVENUE, 
https://revenue.alabama.gov/sales-use/simplified-sellers-use-tax-ssut/simplified-sellers-use-tax-
faqs/ [https://perma.cc/TN6T-DL9L]; see also Jennifer Dunn, Sales Tax by State: Economic Nexus 
Laws, TAXJAR (Jul. 9, 2018), https://blog.taxjar.com/economic-nexus-laws/ [https://perma.cc/ 
JRZ3-YRRL] (“According to state law, sellers who exceed the $250,000 sales threshold are 
required to . . . collect sales tax on sales that ship to Alabama, and remit that sales tax to the State.”). 
310. See ALA. CODE § 40-23-193 (2019) (detailing 8 percent option for flat use rate tax); Dunn, 
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a different legislative approach referred to as a “click-through nexus,” 
which requires remote sellers to pay a tax on gross sales of more than 
$10,000 a year if that seller has any sort of agreement with Idaho sellers 
that refers them to Idaho consumers.311 
Some states were slower to the draw than others because of 
independent roadblocks that required them to focus inwards on 
uniformity.312 Arizona is a prime example. With over 130 jurisdictions 
that levy independent sales taxes, the state only centralized the 
administration of transaction-based taxes in the last few years.313 Arizona 
is one of the states that the Bellas Hess Court might have been worried 
about, as its many jurisdictions would expose remote sellers to a “welter 
of complicated obligations” in determining what taxes needed to be 
collected and where.314 Despite this complexity, Arizona’s legislature 
successfully passed House Bill 2757 that would require a “transaction 
privilege tax” on retail sales that total more than $100,000 for calendar 
year 2021 and beyond.315 States like Arizona demonstrate that the 
existence of various taxable jurisdictions does not preclude the 
establishment of a workable alternative to physical presence nexus.316 It 
 
supra note 309. 
311. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098 (defining click-through nexus as establishing nexus 
through referrals); Gail Cole, Idaho plays hard ball with non-collecting remote sellers, AVALARA: 
ECOMMERCE (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.avalara.com/us/en/blog/2018/08/idaho-plays-hard-
ball-with-non-collecting-remote-retailers.html [https://perma.cc/L2M2-MFD8]; see also TAX 
COMMISSIONER JOSEPH W. TESTA, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2017, DEP’T OF TAXATION 
STATE OF OHIO 32−33 (2017), https://www.tax.ohio.gov/Portals/0/communications/publications/ 
annual_reports/2017AnnualReport/AR2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB5X-2WUN] (detailing 
similar de minimis thresholds ranging from $150,000 through $500,000 of gross receipts 
consummated in Ohio depending on other factors). 
312. BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 16–18. The very tax schema of some states 
lends towards multiple taxation by virtue of the many jurisdictions within them which impose sales 
taxes. See id. at 18 (detailing that Colorado has 328 taxing jurisdictions); see also Wayfair Colorado 
et al. Amici Curiae, supra note 273, at 15 (explaining that it took seven years of litigation post-
Quill to attempt to apply a workable rule regarding economic nexus). 
313. See Transaction Privilege Tax, ARIZ. DEP’T REVENUE, https://azdor.gov/transaction-
privilege-tax-tpt [https://perma.cc/8NUK-K2Y7] (detailing the Arizona Department of Revenue’s 
responsibility to collect taxes from the State’s multiple jurisdictions under the Transaction Privilege 
Tax). 
314. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 759−60 (1967) 
(describing how variations of tax rates and requirements could complicate Bellas Hess’s 
responsibility to multiple jurisdictions, but could also be a problem for other businesses). 
315. See Gail Cole, Arizona Requires Marketplace Facilitators and Remote Sellers to Collect 
Tax, AVALARA (May 29, 2019), https://www.avalara.com/us/en/blog/2019/05/arizona-requires-
marketplace-facilitators-and-remote-sellers-to-collect-sales-tax.html [https://perma.cc/BZE2-
Y4UZ] (summarizing the passage of Arizona’s House Bill 2757 and its implications). 
316. Compare this to a state like California, which has over three hundred taxable jurisdictions. 
BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 16. However, this has not stopped California’s 
legislature from centralizing the state’s tax collection in order to take full advantage of post-Wayfair 
nexus ability. See Dunn, supra note 309 (describing California’s new $500,000 de minimis 
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should be no surprise that the abrogation of the physical presence rule, 
and the possibility of reclaiming a large chunk of state-owed capital, 
would establish incentives for states to make tax collection run as 
smoothly as possible. Anything is better than nothing, after all. 
B.  Opposition: Last States Standing 
Then, there are a group of vehement dissenters to the decision 
comprised of those states which choose not to collect a sales tax in the 
first place.317 Few are as opposed as New Hampshire.318 In an immediate 
response to Wayfair, New Hampshire’s senate unanimously passed a bill 
that would impose legal barriers to other states forcing New Hampshire 
businesses to collect and remit sales or use taxes.319 However, the bill 
was gutted entirely when it went to the house for a vote.320 In light of the 
Wayfair decision, New Hampshire’s arguments against taxation on 
interstate commerce take on a sort of reverse-protectionism that attempts 
to insulate the state’s local businesses from taxes evenly imposed on 
interstate commerce.321 
Under the physical presence rule, protectionism was described as a 
state attempting to impose burdens upon or discriminate against interstate 
 
threshold which took effect April 26, 2019). 
317. See generally Mark Faggiano, U.S. States with No Sales Tax, TAXJAR (May 24, 2018), 
https://blog.taxjar.com/us-states-with-no-sales-tax/ [https://perma.cc/TML7-BWHH]; see BISHOP-
HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 19 (declaring Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, 
and Oregon as “NOMAD States”). 
318. See Brief for State of New Hampshire as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, 
South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494) (detailing the “long, proud history 
of frugality and limited taxation,” which persuaded them to file a brief in support of Respondents); 
see also Daymond Steer, N.H. House Guts Senate Bill Opposing Wayfair Decision, CONWAY 
DAILY SUN (July 25, 2018), https://www.conwaydailysun.com/news/local/n-h-house-guts-senate-
bill-opposing-wayfair-decision/article_f10e5780-8ba3-11e8-8011-532c94b383ec.html 
[https://perma.cc/TRF8-XAHT] (quoting New Hampshire governor Chris Sununu stating “[o]ur 
goal is basically to create every possible barrier that you can imagine, so that even if we are forced 
to [comply with Wayfair], it would be really hard for any jurisdiction to try to do it”). 
319. See Steer, supra note 318 (detailing the bill’s unanimous passage through the New 
Hampshire senate); see also Press Release, Jeff Merkley, U.S. Senator of Oregon, Tester, Shaheen, 
Merkley, Hassan Introduce Bill to Protect Businesses From Collecting Sales Taxes: Senators’ Bill 
Would Reverse Damaging Supreme Court Decision, (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/press-releases/tester-shaheen-merkley-hassan-introduce-
bill-to-protect-businesses-from-collecting-sales-taxes [https://perma.cc/WD7A-TJXU] (detailing 
other non-sales tax states in support of a bill similar to New Hampshire’s). 
320. See generally Steer, supra note 318; see also BISHOP-HENCHMAN ET AL., supra note 247, 
at 19 (detailing New Hampshire’s consideration of the bill which fell through due to “constitutional 
concerns”). 
321. See generally Regan, supra note 6, at 1094–95 (discussing protectionism under the general 
definition which encompasses states enacting legislation to their own benefits but adverse to 
interstate commerce). But see Steer, supra note 318 (discussing New Hampshire’s attempt to 
legislate in direct opposition to the Wayfair decision). 
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commerce in favor of local jurisdictions.322 In the post-Wayfair world, 
without a requirement for physical presence, a state closing its borders to 
shelter its own businesses from a tax that all other states collect without 
issue is certainly a definition of state protectionism.323 The arguments of 
those in opposition to the “Kill Quill” movement rested on anti-
protectionist rhetoric which insisted upon a collective, national 
marketplace that all could engage in equally.324 Now that the Supreme 
Court has leveled the playing field, former physical presence supporters 
embrace the unconstitutional protectionist ideas they once condemned.325 
C.  The Rule Was Never Required in the First Place 
Ultimately, proper examination of the current legislative pushes (or 
lack thereof) in states scrambling to comply with the Wayfair Court’s 
decision yields a telling result: the physical presence rule was never 
needed.326 The safe harbor provisions and SSUTA efforts demonstrate 
that the Court’s reasons for pause were unfounded.327 
 
322. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2018) (detailing the Commerce 
Clause’s central concern focusing on avoidance of “economic Balkanization” against interests of 
states’ engagement in interstate commerce); see also Regan, supra note 6, at 1092–93 (explaining 
that the dormant Commerce Clause assists the Court in balancing concerns been local and interstate 
commerce to ensure that states do not engage in “protectionism,” or in a simpler sense, state-
enacted legislation which discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of local commerce 
and simultaneously infringes upon the Federal Government’s right to regulate commerce). 
323. In short, a state putting up intentional “barriers” to circumvent constitutional practices 
within interstate commerce conveys legislative intent to provide benefit to that state against the 
interests of interstate commerce. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089; see generally Regan, supra note 6, at 
1094–95 (describing internally focused legislation as protectionist). 
324. See Wayfair Respondents’ Brief, supra note 92, at 1–2 (arguing that legislation against the 
physical presence rule would be “burdensome” upon interstate commerce to the benefit of States); 
see also Steer, supra note 318 (discussing New Hampshire’s goal to make it “really hard for any 
jurisdiction” to try and enforce collection and remittance of sales taxes upon New Hampshire 
businesses). 
325. Compare Steer, supra note 318 (detailing New Hampshire Governor’s statements to make 
compliance with constitutional interstate commerce practices as difficult as possible); with Regan, 
supra note 6, at 1092 (“In the central area of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence . . . the Court 
has been concerned exclusively with preventing states from engaging in purposeful economic 
protectionism.”). 
326. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 
274, 279 (1977)) (“First, the physical presence rule is not a necessary interpretation of the 
requirement that a state tax must be ‘applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing 
State.’”). 
327. Commentators suggested de minimis legislation as early as 1986. Hartman, supra note 
234, at 1029. But it was not until Wayfair that the Supreme Court accepted this regulation as 
sufficient to lessen burdens upon interstate commerce. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099–2100. 
Organization amongst states and technological ability existed well before Quill, providing several 
legitimate methods of lessening interstate commerce burdens. See Hartman, supra note 234, at 
1011–12 (discussing automated accounting); Gillis, supra note 261, at 552 (explaining that low-
cost technology to track sales and use taxes existed before Quill). See also Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. 
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In an overcorrection that attempted to address the supposed burden 
remote sellers would face absent the physical presence rule, the Bellas 
Hess Court adopted a rule that bore traces of the dying trends of 
formalism in Commerce Clause interpretation.328 There were other ways 
to address substantial nexus that did not require a bright-line rule made 
to assure compliance.329 In fact, the Court’s ruling in Quill, which 
affirmed such a bright-line rule, is contradictory because the opinion 
endorsed formalistic, judicially-created protection, but in the same breath 
declared that only legislative action should do away with the decision.330 
Congressional silence is not dispositive of Congress’s support of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.331 State representatives attempted to pass 
practical legislation in the face of this burdensome formal rule to address 
the reality of growth in interstate commerce, but time and time again this 
artificially-founded judicial declaration stood in the way of progress.332 
Not only was the rule never required, it contradicts the underpinnings 
of the dormant Commerce Clause as expressed in its founding opinion.333 
In the Supreme Court’s earliest murmurings of the dormant Commerce 
 
v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. at 753, 766 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (objecting to using 
compliance concerns to override state concerns to collect lawful taxes); Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 
(overruling Bellas Hess and Quill). 
328. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (discussing that the Supreme Court has rejected formalistic 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 
(1992) (citing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 281) (detailing Complete Auto’s rejection of formalism). 
329. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (citing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279) (“[T]he physical 
presence rule is not a necessary interpretation of the requirement that a state tax must be applied to 
an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State.”). 
330. The Quill Court managed to defend their acceptance of the physical presence rule by 
stating that “Congress may be better qualified to resolve” the issue, without acknowledging that the 
Court created the rule in the first place. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318. It even went so far as to say that if 
the Court disagreed with the Commerce Clause defense to the rule, the Justices might have chosen 
to affirm anyway on the sole basis that they should defer to Congress. Id. It further defended this 
point by stating that the longevity of the rule’s practice had created a predictable environment for 
consumers and sellers to rely on. Id. at 316. But see Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (“In effect, Quill 
has come to serve as a judicially created tax shelter for businesses that decide to limit their physical 
presence and still sell their goods and services to a State’s consumers—something that has become 
easier and more prevalent as technology has advanced.”). 
331. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 333 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Although 
Congress can and should address itself to this area of law, we should not adhere to a decision, 
however right it was at the time, that by reason of later cases and economic reality can no longer 
be rationally justified.”); see also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096 (“It is inconsistent with the Court’s 
proper role to ask Congress to address a false constitutional premise of this Court’s own creation.”). 
332. See, e.g., KFC v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010) (holding that the 
physical presence rule was not a required interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause as applied 
to a taxpayer’s state income tax on transactions made from out-of-state franchisees); see also 
Geoffrey, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 453 Mass. 87, 89 (2009) (limiting the language from Quill 
and Bellas Hess to apply to sales and use taxes and not to royalty income in the face of an argument 
which invoked the physical presence rule). 
333. See generally Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232 (1872). 
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Clause, the Court grappled with a specific idea: what are states entitled 
to in the realm of interstate commerce?334 Case of the State Freight Tax 
clearly and succinctly described that states are owed something, and 
regardless of flip-flopping between formal and pragmatic readings of the 
doctrine, the dormant Commerce Clause prevailed through nearly 150 
years of case law.335 There is no question that if state law were to tread 
too far into plenary, congressional territory, then that state law would be 
unconstitutional.336 This and other precedent teaches that states are 
entitled to something in areas of congressional inaction.337 What that 
something is has never, nor can ever, be defined with total certainty—but 
the very existence of the dormant Commerce Clause suggests that 
something is owed. 
Wayfair represents a return to the original idea that states cannot be 
unjustly shut out from passing reasonable legislation upon interstate 
commerce.338 While the boundaries of state power are undefined, context 
provides reasons to believe that a sale consummated in a state’s own 
sovereign territory falls well within the state’s ability to lay meaningful 
tax.339 Practical readings of economic nexus under the Commerce Clause 
 
334. See, e.g., id. at 248 (“There can, therefore, be no conflict with a superior enactment, and 
the only question remaining is, whether the power regulating commerce vested in Congress is 
exclusive.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 195−96 (1824) (“This principle is, if possible, still more 
clear, when applied to commerce ‘among the several States.’ They either join each other . . . or they 
are remote from each other. What is commerce ‘among’ them; and how is it to be conducted?”); 
Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829) (“If congress had passed any act 
which bore upon the case . . . we should feel not much difficulty in saying that a state law coming 
in conflict with such act would be void. But congress has passed no such act.”). 
335. The Court’s very discussion in Quill and Wayfair are testament to its authority. See 
Wayfair, 238 S. Ct. at 2090 (“Thus, by implication at least, the Court indicated that the power to 
regulate commerce in some circumstances was held by the States and Congress concurrently.”); 
see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 309 (detailing the Court’s historical interpretations of the “‘negative’ or 
‘dormant’ Commerce Clause”). 
336. See State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. at 248 (“The clause which vests in Congress the power to 
regulate commerce does not, ipso facto, take from the States the right to also regulate commerce, 
provided that the regulations of the latter do not come in conflict with those of the former. If there 
be any conflict, it is conceded that the State law at once falls.”) 
337. See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 261 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (citing Thurlow v. 
Massachusetts (License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 579 (1847)) (“However, unlike the District 
Clause, which empowers Congress ‘To exercise exclusive Legislation,’ the language of the 
Commerce Clause gives no indications of exclusivity.”). 
338. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (first citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 
Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 184 (1995); and then citing C. TROST & P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS 
ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION §11:1, at 471 (2d ed. 2003)) (“All agree that South Dakota has 
the authority to tax these transactions. . . . It has long been settled that the sale of goods or services 
has a sufficient nexus to the State in which the sale is consummated to be treated as a local 
transaction taxable by that State.”). 
339. Use taxes are supposedly a means of filling in the gaps in the tax base that the physical 
presence rule left out with remote sellers, but in actual practice they were not a meaningful 
678 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  51 
expose that formalistic interpretation often creates uncertainty, 
arbitrariness, and illogical results in nearly identical circumstances.340 
What is more, the formalistic rule prescribed advantages to businesses at 
significant disadvantage to states, further tipping the scale in favor of 
interstate vendors without giving states their something owed.341 
CONCLUSION 
The formal underpinnings of the physical presence rule have never had 
a place in Supreme Court jurisprudence, not even in the half century that 
it controlled. The rule ignored its own practical effects only for the sake 
of providing a clear judicial application to the bedrock of dormant 
Commerce Clause interpretations. In practice, while the Court’s 
application of the rule was clear, the results rarely were. Wayfair is not a 
departure from Commerce Clause interpretation as dissenters might 
suggest. Rather, it levels the playing field consistent with decisions that 
go as far back as the inception of the dormant Commerce Clause. While 
pragmatism and formalism are so steeped in the Court’s Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, they are merely a judicial means to this true end: 
an appropriate balance of state and federal power over interstate 
commerce. Instead of working towards this balance, former Courts that 
endorsed formalism fell asleep behind the complicated constitutional 
wheel, allowing uneven results to reign and jeopardizing the longevity of 
the states. Wayfair is not an unconstitutional overstep, it is an overdue 
return to practical form. 
 
alternative as it was nearly impossible to achieve consumer compliance without the assistance of 
the vendors. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing sales taxes and use taxes). 
340. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094−95 (detailing two examples of the physical presence rule 
imposing requirements upon vendors that had a physical presence in a state, despite the 
transaction’s irrelevance to such property); see also supra notes 224−30 and accompanying text 
(describing the rule’s tax protection to Bloomingdales when it created a mailing house to dodge tax 
duties).  
341. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (describing the physical presence rules as an inefficient 
loophole “that gives out-of-state businesses an advantage” and resulting “in significant revenue 
losses to the states”). 
